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IN PURSUIT OF 
TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR RESERVATION TAX REVENUE 
MATIHEW L.M. FLETCHER' 
I. PROLOGUE-THE DEVIL'S JOURNEY OF BUSTER V. WRIGHT 
In the crime film The Usual Suspects, the characters investigate the 
existence and identity of a mysterious Turkish criminal mastermind known 
as Keyser Soze.1 During the film, the police interrogate a petty criminal 
crippled by cerebral palsy named Verbal Kint who spins a web of stories 
about Soze after being arrested during a murderous, violent caper involving 
Soze.2 Kint refuses to disclose the identity of Soze and, paraphrasing 
Charles Baudelaire along the way, lets the cops know that when someone 
like Keyser Soze is that close to getting caught, "you'll never hear from him 
again." 3 
In many ways, the paradox of Keyser Soze-aU evidence points to his 
existence but no one has ever identified him - parallels important aspects of 
Federal Indian Law. Finding Keyser Soze is the equivalent of creating a 
stable reservation revenue source that would allow most Indian tribes to 
function adequately as governments. 
A rather pedestrian case, Buster v. Wright,4 an early Indian law case 
from the 1900s decided by the Eighth Circuit, provides an interesting 
microcosm of the Supreme Court's recent Indian law jurisprudence in this 
area. Buster was the equivalent of an eyewitness that could identify Keyser 
Soze for the tribes searching for a stable revenue source. Following 
Buster's trail, recent cases show how tribes struggle. From the late 1970s to 
'Assistant Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law. Director, Northern Plains 
Indian Law Center. Appellate Judge, Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians. J.D., University of 
Michigan Law School 1997. B.A., University of Michigan 1994. The author is a member of the 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. I wish to thank Wenona Singel, Kirsten 
Carlson, Kristen Carpenter, Del Laverdure, Steve Light, Kathryn Rand, Bill Rice, and Brian 
Upton for their thoughtful comments on this piece. I also wish to thank Tiffany Johnson, Doug 
Murch, Marah deMeule, Katrina Turman, and the other editors of the North Dakota Law Review. 
I. THE USUAL SUSPECfS (PolyGram Filmed Entm't 1995). 
2. One need only have handy a Turkish-to-English dictionary open to the page upon which 
the Turkish word "sozel" is defined for an answer to Keyser Soze's identity. H.C. HONEY & 
FAHIR Iz, THE OXFORD TURKISH-ENGLISH DICfIONARY 430 (3d ed. 1984). 
3. "The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist." THE 
USUAL SUSPECfS, supra note I. 
4. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906). 
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2001, the Supreme Court cited Buster with approval.5 In 2001, that all 
changed.6 
Advocates for Indian Tribes lost Keyser Soze's trail a few years ago 
with a case called Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley.? That case con-
cerned the taxation by the Navajo Nation of a non-Indian-owned business 
located on a postage-stamp of fee land in the middle of the vast Navajo 
Reservation.s Taxing non-Indian-owned businesses is a critical source of 
revenue for Indian tribes without enough natural resources or gaming 
revenue to provide adequate governmental services for its members.9 In 
arguing that it had authority to tax the non-Indian-owned business, the 
Navajo Nation relied heavily upon Buster v. Wright and Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe,lO a 1982 Supreme Court case)! The Nation argued that its 
tax on the non-Indian-owned business located on a speck of fee land within 
the vast Navajo reservation met the so-called Montana 1 test, a test tribes 
must pass in order to regulate non-Indians)2 
Under the Montana 1 test, Indian tribes may regulate or impose taxes 
on non-Indians under very prescribed conditions. 13 In 1981, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Montana v. United States!4 that Indian Tribes may impose its 
regulatory, adjudicatory, or taxation authority on non-members in two cir-
cumstances: (1) "A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other 
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships 
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, 
leases, or other arrangements";!5 or (2) "A tribe may also retain inherent 
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee 
lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct 
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or 
welfare of the tribe."!6 The Supreme Court had applied these tests, known 
as the Montana 1 and Montana 2 exceptions to Indian lawyers, in several 
5. E.g., Merrion v. licarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1983); Nevada v. Hicks, 538 
U.S. 353, 372 (2001). 
6. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 (2001). 
7. 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
8. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 648. 
9. Id. 
10. 455 U.S. 139 (1982). 
II. Atkinson. 532 U.S. at 649. 
12. See Brief for Respondents at 7-8, Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 
(2001) (No. 00-454). 
13. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
14. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
15. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (citing, inter alia, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th 
Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906)). 
16. Id. at 566 (citations omitted). 
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cases previous to Atkinson Trading. 17 Most significantly in the 1997 case 
Strate v. A-J Contractors,lS the Court applied the test to a case brought in a 
tribal court by a non-Indian motorist who had collided with another non-
Indian motorist. 19 Holding that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over two 
non-Indian tort litigants, the Court noted that "Montana's list of cases 
fitting within the first exception ... indicates the activities the Court had in 
mind" and listed, again, Buster v. Wright. 2o In its parenthetical describing 
Buster, the Court wrote, "upholding Tribe's permit tax on nonmembers for 
the privilege of conducting business within Tribe's borders; court charac-
terized as 'inherent' the Tribe's 'authority ... to prescribe the terms upon 
which noncitizens may transact business within its borders. "'21 It appeared 
that, in Strate, the Court said (admittedly in dicta) that Indian Tribes have 
inherent authority to tax non-members that choose to do business within the 
borders of their reservations, a La Buster.22 While it may be that many 
Tribes' reservation boundaries are not extant, the Navajo Nation's reser-
vation remains a striking example of well-preserved Indian Country. 23 
What prompted the Montana Court to utilize Buster v. Wright, a lower 
court case nearly 100 years old that had not been cited at all between 195824 
and 197925 and appeared to be headed toward the dustbin of history?26 
17. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); South Dakota v. 
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 
U.S. 408 (1989). 
18. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
19. Id. at 438. 
20. See id. at 457. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 457-58. 
23. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) (Uintah Valley Reservation); Wisconsin v. 
Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty., 67 F. Supp. 2d 990 (E.D. Wis. (999) (Stockbridge-Munsee 
Reservation). 
24. Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 
(958). 
25. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1979). 
26. Important and influential commentaries from the 1970s and early 1980s did not mention 
Buster at all. E.g., WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1st ed. 
(981); RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN 
TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY (1980); Carole E. Goldberg, A Dynamic View of Tribal 
Jurisdiction to Tax Nonindians, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 166 (1976); S. Bobo Dean, The 
Consent of the Governed?-A New Concept in Indian Affairs?, 48 N.D. L. REV. 529 (1972); 
Marvin J. Sonosky, State Jurisdiction Over Indians In Indian Country, 48 N.D. L. REV. 551 
(1972). The second major federal Indian law casebook also omitted Buster. DAVID H. GETCHES, 
DANIEL M. ROSENFELT, & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (1st ed. (979). However, the first major federal Indian law casebook excerpted 
Buster, particularly the language that suggested that Indian tribes had inherent authority to tax 
non-Indians. MONROE E. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN: READINGS, NOTES AND 
CASES 176-77 (1st ed. 1973); see also MONROE E. PRICE & ROBERT N. CLINTON, LAW AND THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN: READINGS, NOTES AND CASES 277 (2d ed. 1983). But by the most recent 
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Buster did not appear to be the kind of case the Court would dredge up from 
the murky depths of territorial Indian law. In fact, language within Buster 
seems to confirm that Indian Tribes have the inherent authority to tax the 
business activities of non-members: 
The authority of the Creek Nation to prescribe the terms upon 
which noncitizens may transact business within its borders did not 
have its origin in an act of Congress, treaty, or agreement of the 
United States. It was one of the inherent and essential attributes of 
its original sovereignty. It was a natural right of that people, 
indispensable to its autonomy as a distinct tribe or nation, and it 
must remain an attribute of its government until by the agreement 
of the nation itself or by the superior power of the republic it is 
taken from it.27 
In other words, the authority of Indian Tribes to tax non-Indian business 
activities is inherent and extant until Congress sees fit to take it away.28 
This is consistent with the federal Indian law they teach in reputable law 
schools. In fact, the basis for much federal Indian law is the maxim that 
Indian Tribes have the inherent authority of all sovereigns until Congress 
takes it away,29 Chief Justice John Marshall coined the term "domestic 
dependent nations" that is still used to describe this state of existence for 
Tribal sovereigns,30 Perhaps the most salient example of a Tribe's inherent 
authority is the continuing vitality of its defense of sovereign immunity 
from court actions,3) 
But after a twenty-one year absence from state and federal court 
opinions, Buster re-surfaced in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Oliphant v. 
Schlie. 32 The majority of the panel quoted Buster extensively, using the 
language above, for the proposition that Tribes had inherent authority to 
prosecute non-Indians on the reservation, over a strident dissent from then-
Judge Kennedy.33 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision 
in Oliphant.34 Mysteriously, though Buster was not a Supreme Court 
precedent nor had it ever been followed in a Supreme Court opinion, Buster 
edition of this casebook, discussion of Buster independent of its citation in Supreme Court cases 
had ceased. ROBERT N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG & REBECCA TSOSIE, AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW: NA nVE NA nONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (4th ed. 2003). 
27. Buster, 135 F. at 950. 
28. [d. 
29. E.g., United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628, 1634-37 (2004). 
30. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1,15 (1831). 
31. E.g., Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 753-60 (1998). 
32. 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1979). 
33. See Oliphant, 544 F.2d at 1009-10. 
34. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,212 (1978). 
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then became a regular guest star in Supreme Court opinions, showing up in 
the Court's opinion in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Indian Reservation35 for the innocuous proposition that the Tribes have the 
"power to tax non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic 
acti v i ty . "36 
In Buster's next and most crucial appearance, the Montana Court 
dropped Buster in between three other Supreme Court cases, Williams v. 
Lee,37 Morris v. Hitchcock,38 and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Indian Reservation, as authority for the Montana J exceptions. 39 
These cases are the four examples of when an Indian Tribe may invoke the 
Montana J exceptions and regulate non-members. The first, Williams, held 
that state courts have no jurisdiction over civil cases brought by a non-
Indian against an Indian for disputes arising out of events that occur on the 
reservation (again, the Navajo Nation).40 Williams did not involve any 
tribal action, so that case does not really create an example of a situation 
where a Tribe can regulate a non-member. Morris is trickier because it 
involved non-member grazing on land owned and controlled by the 
Chickasaw Nation, but the Court read the relevant treaty and Act of 
Congress and concluded that Congress had intended to allow the Chickasaw 
Nation to tax the non-member cattle grazers.41 Buster, fitting in the list 
right after Morris, appears to be virtually the same, with the Department of 
Interior even agreeing to collect the Creek Nation's taxes from the non-
Indians, but Buster extended the authority to land owned by non-
members.42 Colville followed with a "see" signal, which in the Bluebook 
means that the "[c]ited authority clearly supports the proposition."43 There 
the Court held that Indian Tribes have inherent authority to tax non-
members engaging in economic activity, building upon Buster.44 
These then are the four circumstances the Court cited to indicate when 
an Indian Tribe has inherent authority as a domestic dependent nation to 
regulate or tax non-members. Williams is inconsequential and Morris and 
35. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
36. Colville. 447 U.S. at 153. 
37. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
38. 194 U.S. 384 (1904). 
39. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
40. Williams, 358 U.S. at 218. 
41. Morris, 194 U.S. at 716. 
42. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 957-58 (8th Cir. 1905). 
43. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 22 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et 
al eds., 17th ed. 2000). 
44. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
153,157 (1980). . 
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Buster did not help the Navajo Nation in Atkinson because Congress did not 
provide for the taxation authority by statute. But Colville suggests a much 
broader authority. And wait! "Inherent authority" means that the Tribe had 
it all along, so it did not need a statute from Congress. A statute from Con-
gress authorizing the Tribe to do something is a delegation.45 Where did 
the "inherent authority" in Buster come from? The Colville Court cited 
Buster's broad language about a tribe's inherent authority,46 but wasn't 
Buster actually a case involving a Congressional delegation? 
To cure this problem, this swamp of confusion, the Navajo Nation 
relied on Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe to shore up Buster. In Merrion, 
the Court upheld the inherent authority of Tribes to tax non-members 
producing oil and gas from within the reservation.47 Again relying on 
Buster, the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Marshall, held that 
Tribes have the inherent authority to tax non-members, even on land owned 
by non-Indians.48 It looked like Justice Marshall settled any dispute with 
his adoption of Buster's broadest language. According to Merrion, an 
Indian Tribe (with extant reservation boundaries) has inherent authority to 
tax the business activities of non-members on Indian land or on non-Indian-
owned fee land.49 Where is Atkinson Trading, or Cameron Trading Post 
coming from? Who do they think they are, after Merrion, to think they 
have a chance of beating the Navajo Nation on this point? There they are, 
located on a postage stamp of land, well within the vast Navajo Nation 
reservation. They were in the exact situation the Court must have been 
talking about in Montana J. 
Well, the answer is that the last twenty-odd years after Merrion have 
not been good ones for litigating Tribes appearing before the Supreme 
Court.50 Professor David Getches, writing in the year before Atkinson 
Trading, noted that convicted criminals have a better win rate before the 
Rehnquist Court than Tribes.51 In other words, Verbal Kint had a better 
45. See. e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). 
46. Colville, 447 U.S. at 153 (citing Buster, 135 F. at 950). 
47. Merrion v. licarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 142-44 (1982). 
48. See id. at 143-44 (quoting Buster, 135 F. at 952). 
49. See id. 
50. Or before that, most would argue. See, e.g., BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 
137-202 (arguing that the Court began to go wrong in the early 1970s). 
51. See David Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' 
Rights, Colorblind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 281 (2001) (citing 
thirty-six percent for criminals and twenty-three percent for Tribes). See generally Bethany 
Berger, "Power Over this Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v. 
Rogers,45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957 (2004); Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's 
Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial 
Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405 (2003); Joseph William Singer, Canons of 
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chance of having his conviction for possession of illegal weapons, second 
degree, overturned on appeal than Indian Tribes would have of winning any 
case before the Court. The Supreme Court with the Montana case had 
erected a barrier precluding tribal authority over non-Indians.52 Though the 
Court listed a few exceptions, it was not really serious about them. In fact, 
after Strate, those exceptions appeared to be shrinking into oblivion.53 
Somehow, Merrion had all but faded from discussion. Wasn't Merrion de-
cided after Montana? If Montana is inconsistent with Merrion, then 
Merrion should be the boss of the hot sauce. After all, it came later. If the 
Court had forgotten about Merrion, maybe it needed to be reminded. 
Maybe Merrion needed to be rescued. 
After a careful reading of Buster and armed with Justice Marshall's 
opinion in Merrion, the Navajo Nation thought it had something-a lead, a 
break in the case, some key piece of authority that would create positive 
precedent for Indian tribes. Finding a leak in the Montana barrier was akin 
to the police catching Keyser Soze: first, the Tribes had to prove its exis-
tence, and second, they had to exploit it. And, just like the interrogating 
cops in The Usual Suspects, who had in their possession the sole survivor of 
a violent criminal conspiracy spearheaded by Keyser Soze, the Navajo Na-
tion's attorneys rounded up the best authority it could find. They thought 
they had the answer to unlocking the door, to finding the arch-criminal, but 
it did not happen. 
The Supreme Court pulled the rug out from under the Navajo Nation, 
just as Keyser Soze tricked the police. The Court said, in what appears to 
be one of the most disingenuous and intellectually dishonest statements of 
the young century, "[ w]e have never endorsed Buster's statement that an 
Indian tribe's 'jurisdiction to govern the inhabitants of a country is not 
Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 641 (2002-
2003); Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships. and Commentary: The 
Malaise of Federal Indian Law through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA L.1. 5 (2002); Sarah 
Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 
50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (2001); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of the Implicit Divesti-
ture Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36 TULSA L. J. 
367 (2000); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31 (1996); 
Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381 (1993). Cj. Abby Abinanti, A 
Letter to Justice O'Connor, 1 INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' J. OF L., CULTURE & RESISTANCE 1 (2004) 
(recalling the human impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)). 
52. See supra notes 13-16, and accompanying text. 
53. See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial 
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.1. 1,57 (1999). 
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conditioned or limited by the title to the land which they occupy in it. "'54 
But wait, there's Merrion, which quoted Buster's statement on the next 
page of the 135th volume of the first series of the Federal Reporter that 
"[n]either the United States, nor a state, nor any other sovereignty loses the 
power to govern the people within its borders by the existence of towns and 
cities therein endowed with the usual powers of municipalities, nor by the 
ownership nor occupancy of the land within its territorial jurisdiction by 
citizens or foreigners."55 No good, said the Court, because the tax in Atkin-
son Trading was not on triballand-"[an] Indian tribe's sovereign power to 
tax-whatever its derivation-reaches no further than tribal land."56 In 
other words, "Buster is not an authoritative precedent."57 
It was not as if the police interrogating Keyser Soze were buffoons. 
The attorneys for the Navajo Nation followed the manual for litigating 
cases to the letter. Before Atkinson Trading, Indian Tribes had inherent au-
thority to tax non-members conducting business activities within the 
reservation.58 Colville said it.59 Merrion said it.60 Buster said it, and the 
Court relied upon Buster in Montana, the source of this line of crazed au-
thority.61 But, just as Keyser Soze narrowly escaped the clutches of the 
police with an entertaining and fantastic story, the Supreme Court told the 
Navajo Nation that Tribes do not have inherent authority to tax non-
members on fee land, even though that is what the Court had been saying 
all along (admittedly in dicta). 
Then a few weeks later in Nevada v. Hicks,62 the Court blocked off a 
potential key avenue for the tribes, just as Keyser Soze conspired to assas-
sinate Edie Finneran, the woman he believed to be the last living person 
that could positively identify him. After Hicks, it no longer mattered if the 
non-member was doing business on tribal land or not-the Tribes still had 
no jurisdiction over that person.63 
54. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc., v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 n.4 (quoting Buster v. Wright, 
135 F. 947, 951 (1905)). 
55. Merrion v. licarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 143 (quoting Buster, 135 F. at 952 
(emphasis deleted)). 
56. Atkinson Trading, 532 U.S. at 653. 
57. Id. at 653 n.4. 
58. E.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134, 153 (1980) 
59. Id. 
60. Merrion,455 U.S. at 142-44. 
61. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 
957-58 (1905). 
62. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
63. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 353. 
HeinOnline -- 80 N.D. L. Rev. 767 2004
2004] TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 767 
The Tribes were left to walk away from these cases knowing how close 
they came to catching up with the Court-and to their Keyser Soze. They 
are not likely to get that close again. Maybe the Court made a tiny mistake 
in including Buster v. Wright in the list of Montana J exceptions, but in 
Atkinson Trading and Hicks, it bluntly corrected that mistake. And like 
Verbal Kint predicted, "and like that, he's gone." 
It actually appears the Tribes are worse off than the cops in The Usual 
Suspects because at least the police proved the existence of Keyser Soze; 
the Tribes have yet to prove the tangible existence of a Montana exception 
to the Supreme Court. But at the end of The Usual Suspects, a fax comes 
through to the police station with a sketch of the face of Keyser Soze, a 
sketch created from the eyewitness testimony of a Hungarian mobster on 
his deathbed named Artash Kobash. Kobash has bums over sixty percent of 
his body and spends part of the film in a coma. He is not a healthy witness. 
It would not take much to knock him off. It is likely that once Keyser Soze 
hears that Artash Kobash is singing like a canary from his hospital bed, a 
hired gun who does not know he is working for Keyser Soze will sneak into 
his room and finish the job. 
But maybe there is another witness out there. Will Keyser Soze come 
up one last time to finish off that one, too? The police at the end of the film 
know what Keyser Soze looks like-they have a piece of paper with a 
mean-looking drawing of Kevin Spacey's face on it-but that will get them 
nothing if they do not have a living witness. It appears that Indian Tribal 
governments' last remaining witnesses were Buster v. Wright and Merrion 
v. licarilla Apache Tribe. Were their disappearances "cruel joke[s]"64 
played by the Supreme Court? 
It is time for the Supreme Court to stop hiding the ball. The easiest 
way for the Court to accomplish this task is merely treat tribal governments 
as governments and not as private associations. This article proposes just 
that. Part II starts by noting that no government-federal, state, local, or 
tribal-can function without revenues. Part II then identifies the state of 
federal Indian law in this area. Part III discusses how tribal governments 
chose the only remaining option to raise revenue-economic develop-
ment-an option selected by non-Indian governments in similar circum-
stances. Part III describes in detail many of the businesses tribes have 
started and where they have succeeded and failed. Part IV discusses the 
practical limitations of using economic development to create governmental 
revenue. First, federal and state law generally prohibits tribes from ex-
ploiting a government's presumptive authority to avoid taxes-known as 
64. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 653 (1978). 
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"marketing the exemption" - in spite of the fact that state and local 
governments market their exemptions without objection. Second, special 
interests, usually economic competitors of tribes, object to tribal economic 
development by using their lobbying resources and power to create a back-
lash against tribal economic development. Third, Indian tribes have arti-
ficial institutional limitations to creating economic development. Fourth, 
there are actual physical dangers for some tribes in generating economic 
development, dangers from both inside and outside the tribe. Part V pro-
vides four suggestions for law reform. The first three amount to what some 
commentators and Indian advocates have called the "Hicks fix," perhaps an 
impossible task in practice, but the fourth is a relatively simple solution to 
many problems facing Indian tribes in this area, a solution that could be 
implemented with a favorable court ruling or a technical amendment to the 
Tribal Tax Status Act.65 
II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE-
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, STATES, LOCALITIES, AND TRIBES 
One of the more critical lessons learned by the Founders at the time of 
the Constitutional Convention was that a government cannot function 
without revenue.66 As a result, the Constitution provides the federal 
government with the power to lay taxes.67 State constitutions provide state 
65. See generally Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 
96 Stat. 2607 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.c. § 7871 (2000». 
66. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 587 (1895) (Field, J., 
concurring). 
The subject of taxation in the new government which was to be established created 
great interest in the convention which framed the constitution, and was the cause of 
much difference of opinion among its members, and earnest contention between the 
states. The great source of weakness of the confederation was its inability to levy 
taxes of any kind for the support of its government. To raise revenue it was obliged to 
make requisitions upon the states, which were respected or disregarded at their 
pleasure. Great embarrassments followed the consequent inability to obtain the neces-
sary funds to carry on the government. One of the principle objects of the proposed 
new government was to obviate this defect of the confederacy by conferring authority 
upon the new government by which taxes could be directly laid whenever desired. 
Id.; see also Christopher S. Jackson, The Inane Gospel of Tax Protest: Resist Rendering Unto 
Caesar- Whatever His Demands, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 297 (1996-1997) ("Initially, the central 
government relied upon revenue requests made to the states to pay the young nation's debt."). See 
generally Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1999). 
67. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, d. 1; see also id. §§ 2, 8, 9; Graves v. New York ex rei. 
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 488 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Congress ... can reach every 
person and every dollar with due regard to Constitutional limitations as to the method of laying 
taxes.") (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
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governments-and, concomitantly, local governments-the power to lay 
taxes.68 
Indian tribes are not states, nor are they local governments.69 Other 
than three innocuous references to Indian tribes,7o the Constitution is silent 
as to the powers of tribal governments.7! They are "extra-constitutional."72 
They are, according to the Supreme Court, "domestic dependent nations."73 
Much legal scholarship has arisen debating the origins and meaning of this 
68. See Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 621 (1895) ("The founders 
anticipated that the expenditures of the States, their counties, cities, and towns, would chiefly be 
met by direct taxation on accumulated property .... "); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. 
5,29 (1873). In Union Pacific, the Supreme Court held: 
That the taxing power of a State is one of its attributes of sovereignty; that it exists 
independently of the Constitution of the United States, and underived from that instru-
ment; and that it may be exercised to an unlimited extent upon all property, trades, 
business, and avocations existing or carried on within the territorial boundaries of the 
State, except so far as it has been surrendered to the Federal government, either ex-
pressly or by necessary implication, are propositions that have often been asserted by 
this court. 
Id.; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,42 (1824) (noting that state and federal taxing authority is 
"concurrent"). 
69. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191-92 (1988) (citing U.S. 
CON ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3); WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 29 
(4th ed. 2004) (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896». 
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl 3; id. § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
71. See Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1086-
1102 (2004). 
72. See United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628, 1641 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(describing Indian tribes as "extraconstitutional"); Note, International Law as an Interpretive 
Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1751, 1755 n.26 (2003) (quoting CHARLES F. 
WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LA W: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 112-13 (1987»; Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and Federal 
Courts: A Very Preliminary Set of Notes for Federal Courts and Teachers, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.1. 63, 
65 (2004) (describing federal Indian law as based on an "extra-constitutional regime") (citing 
Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.1. 
113 (2002»; Donald E. Laverdure, A Historical Braid of Inequality: An Indigenous Perspective 
of Brown v. Board of Education, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 285, 295 n.73 (2004) (describing federal 
"plenary power" over Indian tribes as "extra-constitutional"); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians. Aliens. Territories. and the Nineteenth Century Origins of 
Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1,25 (2002). 
73. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831); see also United States v. Lara, 124 S. 
Ct. 1628, 1636 (2004); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 
505,509 (1991); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
U.S. 408, 451 (1989) (Blackmun, concurring and dissenting); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 
455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,215 (1962); Roffv. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 
221 (1897). 
Armed with the "domestic dependent nations" label it firmly attached to Indian tribes, the 
Supreme Court in 1883 announced that Congress has plenary power of Indian affairs. See Ex 
parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolf 
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); see also CANBY, supra note 69, at 93 ("Congress' power over 
Indian affairs is plenary. It has been deemed to arise from the Indian Commerce Clause or even 
from the fact of conquest.") (citing United States v. Long, 324 F.3d 475, 479 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 580 U.S. 822 (2003». 
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phrase,74 but suffice it to say that Indian tribes are recognized as govern-
ments,75 replete with sovereign immunity76 and the power to tax both its 
own members77 and, in some limited circumstances, non-Indians.78 Indian 
tribes and their members residing on their own tribe's land are generally 
immune from state taxation and regulation.79 
74. E.g., Judith Resnik, Tribes. Wars. and the Federal Courts: Applying the Myths and 
Methods of Marbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts' Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 77 
(2004); Carey N. Vicenti, The Social Structures of Legal Neocolonialism in Native America, 10 
KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'y, Spr. 2001, at 513, 518 (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall made up the 
term "domestic dependent nations"); Siegfried Weissner, American Indian Treaties and Modem 
International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567 (1995); Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With 
Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461 (1991); 
Jill Norgren, Protection of What Rights They Have: Original Principles of Federal Indian Law. 
64 N.D. L. REV. 73 (1988); William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law 
Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1987). Cf Prakash, supra note 71 (searching for a textual basis in 
the Constitution and elsewhere for plenary power over Indian tribes); Clinton, supra note 72 
(arguing that there is no authority for plenary power over Indian tribes). 
75. See John F. Petoskey, Doing Business With Michigan Indian Tribes, 76 MICH. B. 1. 440, 
440 (1997); Judith V. Royster, Oil and Water in the Indian Country, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 457, 
483 (1997); Allen H. Sanders, Damaging Indian Treaty Fisheries: A Violation of Tribal Property 
Rights?, 17 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 153, 174 (1996). 
76. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg Techs. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); Okla. Tax 
Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Indians, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991); Three 
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986); 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,58 (1978); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game, 
433 U.S. 165, 167 (1977); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506,512 (1940). 
77. See generally Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (rejecting the argument that tribes no longer possess the power to tax) (citing 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978». 
78. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982); see also Atkinson 
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 651 (2001) (describing the circumstances in which an Indian 
tribe may tax non-members) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,565,566 (1981). 
79. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2000) ("[Indian lands] shall be exempt from State and local 
taxation."); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866) (holding that states have no authority to tax 
Indian trust lands); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,215 n.17 (1987) 
(noting that the Court has adopted a "per se" rule: "We have recognized that the federal tradition 
of Indian immunity from state taxation is very strong and the state interest is correspondingly 
weak. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to rebalance these interests in every case."). E.g., Okla. Tax 
Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (holding that state may not impose motor fuel 
taxes in Indian Country where the legal incidence of the tax falls on the tribe or its members); 
Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993) (holding that state may not impose 
vehicle excise and registration fees on Indians who live and garage their vehicles on the 
reservation); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (holding that a state could not tax 
tribal royalties from mineral leases); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (holding that a 
state had no authority to tax non-trust land owned by a tribal member where the land is located on 
the tribe's reservation); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) 
(same); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (holding that affixation to real 
estate at tribal off-reservation economic development projects were exempt from state taxation 
because it was situated on land leased from the federal government); McClanahan v. Ariz. State 
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (holding that a state may not tax income of tribal members 
residing on their own reservation). 
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Complicating these matters exponentially, states and localities may tax 
non-Indians residing in Indian Country80 and, in some limited circum-
stances, the Indians living in Indian Country.81 This has created on some 
reservations the specter of double taxation, meaning that where an Indian 
tribe might tax a non-Indian owned business, the state may also do SO.82 
This, in turn, creates a strong disincentive for non-Indian businesses to op-
erate businesses in Indian Country.83 
Tribal governments have extreme difficulty in raising revenue; they 
have virtually no tax base.84 As one federal court noted, "the Indians have 
no viable tax base and a weak economic infrastructure. Therefore, they, 
even more than the states, need to develop creative ways to generate 
80. E.g., Ariz. Dept. of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999) (holding that a 
state may tax non-member company that performs work on the reservation); Dept. of Taxation & 
Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994) (holding that Indian traders are required to 
collect sales taxes from non-Indians and remit those taxes to the state); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. 
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (holding that a state may tax non-
members in Indian Country); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989) 
(holding that a state may tax a non-Indian business that does business with a tribe or the federal 
government even where the "financial burden" of the tax falls on the tribe or the United States); 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (same); 
Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) (holding that states may tax property of non-Indians in 
Indian Country); Utah & N.R.R. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) (same). 
81. E.g., Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998) 
(holding that a state may tax land owned by a tribe where land had been made freely alienable by 
Congress); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 
U.S. 251 (1992) (same). 
82. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (permitting dual 
taxation of oil and gas severance tax); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Reservation,447 U.S. 134 (1980) (permitting dual taxation of cigarettes sold in tribal smoke 
shops). Cf Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998) (holding that a state was not 
required to return excessive tax receipts collected in Indian Country). 
83. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274, 1283 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(acknowledging that dual taxation reduces tribal revenues); Judith V. Royster, Mineral 
Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 
TULSA L.J. 541, 611 (1993) ("The dual tax burden renders tribal mineral development 
considerably less attractive than development of off-reservation minerals, reducing the value of 
the mineral resource."); Comment, The Case for Exclusive Tribal Power to Tax Mineral Lessees 
of Indian Lands, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 491, 491-92 (1975) ("Another important economic element 
in the leasing context is state taxation of reservation lessees. Indeed, such a state tax may place a 
far greater burden on the lessee than do the contractual royalty payments provided in the lease 
agreement.") (footnotes omitted). 
84. See Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 169 
(2004) ("But few tribes have any significant tax base."); Milo Colton, Self-Determination and the 
American Indian: A Case Study, 4 SCHOLAR I, 35 n.270 (2001) ("In order to be successful, 
tribal governments must generate revenue through the development of businesses because they are 
prevented from establishing a stable tax base."); Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 1058, 1073 (1982) ("Unlike other governmental bodies, Indian tribes would 
find the loss of assets more difficult to replace because tribes only have a limited revenue base 
over which to spread any losses.") (citing Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 169 (Alaska 1977)); 
Janet I. Tu, Economic Focus: As Casinos Struggle, Tribes Look to Other Industries, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 28, 1998, at 1 ("'Tribes don't have the funding base that other governments do,' says Jennifer 
Scott, assistant director of Washington State's Governor's Office of Indian Affairs."). 
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revenue."85 Property tax revenue is generally unavailable to tribal govern-
ments, mostly because taxing tribal members would be pointless and 
counterproductive.86 Moreover, often tribes control or own a relatively 
small proportion of land within their reservations.87 Some tribes can create 
a tax base by entering into favorable tax agreements with the states in which 
they reside.88 Nevada tribes can keep the sales and excise tax revenue they 
85. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300, 1315 n. 21 (D.D.C. 1987). 
86. Cf Dena Aubin, Native Americans Face Hurdles for Financing, WALL ST. J., June 26, 
2000, at A43 ("One problem is that property taxes-a key backing for city and county 
debt-aren't a viable option for most tribes .... Even tribes that own land are reluctant to tax it 
because of their different traditions and notions of land ownership. "). 
87. See Steven Stingley, Indian Tribes Detail Economic Strategy to State Senators, OMAHA 
WORLD-HERALD, June 8, 1984, available at 1984 WL 2522275. Stingley cautions: 
Id. 
In addition to the lack of capital to start projects, the leaders said, Indians control very 
littIe-20 percent or less-of the land within their reservations. Most of the land has 
been purchased by non-Indians, creating what they called, "checkerboard" 
reservations because the Indians only own unconnected squares of land. 
88. See. e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the 
Michigan Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (2004); Elizabeth Carvlin, 
South Dakota Signs Third Tax Agreement With Indian Tribe, BOND BUYER, Dec. 29, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 64229435; Danny & Jim Simon, Success of Tribal Casinos Raises Taxing 
Question: Indian Leaders Claim Government Has No Right to a Share of Profits, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Nov. 23, 1995, available at 1995 WL 11799673 ('''Our option is we can try to 
work out constructive agreements that will allow continued economic development, or we can 
keep beating our treaty-rights drum, and probably stay poor. "'). 
Unfortunately for tribes seeking to reduce confrontation and conflict with states, some com-
mentators argue that tribal-state tax agreements are either unenforceable or unconstitutional. One 
commentator argued that entering into agreements with a state will lead to the (unquantified) 
diminishment of tribal sovereignty. See generally Oliver Kim, When Things Fall Apart: 
Liabilities and Limitations of Compacts Between State and Tribal Governments, 26 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 48 (2002). Professor Robert N. Clinton has suggested that tribal-state tax agreements are 
unconstitutional under federal law. Robert N. Clinton, Comity & Colonialism: The Federal 
Courts' Frustration of Tribal-Federal Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 22-23 n.54 (2004). 
Professor Clinton argues that states are constitutionally incapable of negotiating "some questions 
with the tribes without federal approval." Id. at 22 n.54. Professor Clinton argues that the modern 
Supreme Court would likely adopt an analysis that "could protect federal supremacy in the 
negotiation of Indian agreements affecting sovereignty .... " Id. at 23 n.54. Professor Clinton 
considers this strategy of pursuing negotiation in absence of federal approval "legally myopic and 
badly flawed." Id. at 22 n.54. However, statutes such as the Indian Tribal Economic Develop-
ment Contract Encouragement Act, amended 25 U.S.c. § 81 to allow tribes to negotiate certain 
business deals without federal approval. See Jack F. Williams, Integrating American Indian Law 
Into the Commercial Law and Bankruptcy Curriculum, 37 TULSA L .. REV. 557, 557-58 (2001); 
Anna-Emily C. Gaupp, Note, The Indian Tribal Economic Development And Contracts 
Encouragement Act of 2000, 33 CONN. L. REV. 667 (2001); see also Indian Tribal Economic 
Development and Contract Encouragement Act, Pub. L. No. 106-179, 114 Stat. 46 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.c. § 81 (2000» (noting the intent of Congress to amend § 81 to explicitly limit 
the types of contracts that require federal approval). This amendment of § 81, which limits the 
need for federal approval of contracts to contracts that "encumber[] Indian land for a period of 7 
or more years," 25 U.S.c. § 81(b) (2000), should be adequate to "authorize" a state to enter into 
an agreement with a tribe without federal approval. See Clinton, supra, at 23 n.54 ("The states 
would totally lack authority to negotiate issues commonly found in most Indian gaming compacts 
without the authority afforded them by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act."). Assuming Professor 
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collect from non-Indians if they enter into a tax agreement with the state.89 
South Dakota has encouraged tribes to charge a gas tax rate the same as the 
state's rate, which, according to the state, is "'quite [the] revenue oppor-
tunity for tribes. "'90 
The lack of a stable tax base is a product of federal Indian law. First, 
tribes rarely may tax non-Indian businesses.9! Usually, because of the dou-
ble taxation problem, they do not even in situations where they could.92 
Second, tribes usually do not tax their own members.93 Indian tribal 
Clinton's constitutional argument is correct, tribes and states could attempt to file a "friendly" suit 
in federal court, expressing their tax issues in a complaint and counterclaims, and then stipulating 
to a resolution that effectively embodies the agreement previously reached between the parties. 
Cj. Matthew S. Galbraith, Tribe Claims to Own Property on ND Campus; Federal Suit Seeks 
Possession. Damages for Lass of Land, SOUTH BEND TRIB. (Ind.), Jan. 5, 2004, at AI ("'As I 
understand it, it's a friendly suit,' [John Hamilton] said."). Seven Michigan Tribes and the State 
of Michigan resolved its gaming issues in 1993 with such a consent judgment. See Taxpayers of 
Mich. Against Casinos v. State, 685 N.W.2d 221, 248 (Mich. 2004) (Markman, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
Despite these commentators' pessimism, tribes and progressive states and localities continue 
to negotiate agreements with real world allocation of risks and benefits. See generally. e.g., 
Retcher, supra note 88 (discussing the negotiations between the State of Michigan and several 
Michigan Indian tribes); Stetson Gover & P.c. Williams, Tribal-State Dispute Resolution: Recent 
Attempts, 36 S.D. L. REV. 77 (1991) (describing the negotiations between the State of New 
Mexico and two Indian pueblos over taxes; between the State of California and a Mission Indian 
band over environmental regulation; between the State of Wyoming and the Wind River Tribes 
over taxes and water right; and between the State of New York and the Seneca Nation over taxes); 
Brief for Amicus Curiae National Congress of American Indians, et ai, at 12-17, 20-27, Inyo 
County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 
(2003) (No. 02-281) (discussing law enforcement agreements between several states and localities 
and Indian tribes). Other distinguished commentators have strongly advocated for tribes to choose 
negotiation over litigation, especially considering the federal courts' reticence to uphold tribal 
legal positions over state legal positions. Lorie Graham, Securing Economic Sovereignty through 
Agreement, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 523 (2003); Richard J. Ansson, State Taxation of Non-Indians 
Whom Do Business With Indian Tribes: Why Several Recent Ninth Circuit Rulings Reemphasize 
the Need for Indian Tribes to Enter Into Taxation Compacts With Their Respective State, 78 OR. 
L. REV. 501 (1999); Joel H. Mack & Gwyn Goodson Timms, Cooperative Agreements: 
Government-to-Government Relations to Foster Reservation Business Development, 20 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1225 (1993). The revenue benefits to these inter-governmental agreements go both ways, as 
one federal court noted "[I]ocal governments in the area expect to receive significant revenues 
through cooperation agreements with the Pokagon [Band of Potawatomi Indians]." TOMAC v. 
Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d 182, 186 (D.D.C. 2002). 
89. Jerry Zremski, Tribes Thrive on Store Sales; Unlike the Senecas. Most Indian Nations 
Own Businesses. and Profits Go to Reservation, BUFFALO NEWS, June 29, 2004, at AI, available 
at 2004 WL 60043892 (discussing tax agreement entered into by Reno Sparks Indian Colony). 
90. Terry Woster, S.D. Asks Tribes to Impose Gas Tax, ARGUS LEADER (S.D.), July 29, 
2003, at AI (quoting South Dakota Revenue and Regulation Secretary Gary Viken). 
91. E.g. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (holding that Indian 
tribes may not tax non-Indian-owned businesses on fee land absent narrow exceptions). 
92. E.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (holding that states 
may tax non-Indian-owned businesses on tribal lands even where the tribe maintains a similar tax; 
approving double taxation). 
93. See Kristen E. Burge, Comment, ERISA and Indian Tribes: Alternative Approaches for 
Respecting Tribal Sovereignty, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1291, 1317 ("Furthermore, although tribes 
have the power to tax and raise revenue to fund government program and services, their tax base 
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governments are more accountable to their constituents than virtually all 
non-Indian governments and therefore rarely enact taxation statutes that 
will affect their relatives and neighbors (not if they want to get re-elected, 
anyway). Even if tribes began taxing their own members, there is very little 
income, property, or sales they could tax.94 If tribal members already had 
money and property, tribal government revenue would not be an issue, nor 
would tribal government services, which are very much in demand. Third, 
Indian tribes generally may not tax non-Indian individuals.95 Because 
Indian tribes usually may not tax non-Indians (that is, the people with 
income and property in Indian Country), there is no stable tax base on most 
reservations. 
Congress's attempts to assist Indian tribes in statutes, such as the Tribal 
Tax Status Act, have amounted to an empty action in most instances.96 As 
Professor Robert A. Williams, Jr. wrote in 1985, "[t]he Tribal Tax Status 
Act does not provide a mechanism that would enable tribes to create a 
thriving economic environment within Indian Country. Instead, it offers 
tribes only the theoretical ability to exercise broadly based taxing authority 
over a nonexistent tax base."97 In response to the lack of a stable tax base, 
Indian tribes have little resort except to pursue an alternative method of 
raising revenue: economic development. 
III. THE RISE OF TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS A 
SUBSTITUTE FOR RESERVATION TAX REVENUE 
Despite state and local governments' protestations and the Supreme 
Court's apparent disregard of tribal rights, Indian tribes act as though they 
are functioning governments. Many reservations depend almost entirely on 
federal government funding to function. The Oglala Sioux Tribe, for exam-
ple, is "'90 percent dependent on the Federal Government .... "'98 Federal 
is small because reservations are sparsely populated and the residents often have a low per capita 
income.") (footnote omitted). 
94. See id.; Comment, supra note 83 at 491 ("Indian tribal governments are in dire financial 
straits, without any adequate source of revenue. In light of the prevalence of abject poverty, 
unemployment, and lack of education among reservation Indians, the taxing of tribal members is 
not a feasible solution."). 
95. Cf Big Horn County Elec. Co-op v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir. 2000) (enjoining 
tribe from taxing non-Indian-owned business). 
96. Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2607 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 7871 (2000». 
97. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian 
Nations: The Indian Tribe Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982,22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335,385 
(1985). 
98. James Brooke, Proposed Cuts in Indian Programs Hit Those Who Most Rely on Federal 
Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1995, at 16 (quoting Delbert Brewer, superintendent of the Oglala 
Sioux Bureau of Indian Affairs office). 
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funding is an extremely unreliable source of revenue for tribal govern-
ment.99 And yet the unmet need for tribal government service projects 
approached $60 billion a year by the turn of the century.lOO 
But tribal governments do not fade away in the face of these 
overwhelming disadvantages. As the Wall Street Journal noted, "Tribal 
governments operate much like municipal governments, providing police 
and fire protection, road building and education."101 Tribal governments 
generally use revenue derived from tribal businesses "to build new schools 
and provide better health care"102 and pay for governmental services such as 
"law enforcement and day care."103 They enact zoning ordinances, law and 
order codes, and, when they can, engage in the most fundamental activity 
for any government: taxation,l04 
In operating business, Indian tribes must choose between several 
directions: whether to use the business as a revenue generator to pay for 
tribal government services; whether to use the business as a job creation 
mechanism for tribal members; simply whether to seek profit for its 
members in the same way a corporation or partnership seeks profit for its 
partners or shareholders; or a combination of any of the above. IOS Rarely 
Id. 
99. See. e.g .• id. Brooke explained: 
Although the bureau is required to finance tribal schools at the same per-student 
average as the states they are in, Congress approved separate, and unequal, education 
levels. In a financing pattern that is similar for most Indian education, Congressional 
financing allows the bureau to spend $2,900 on each high school student here, while 
South Dakota spends an average of $3,350 for each student in public schools outside 
reservations. 
100. See Aubin, supra note 86, at A43 ("A recent study by the First Nations Development 
Institute, a nonprofit ... corporation, estimates capital needs on Indian reservations are as high as 
$15 billion a year for public projects alone. Adding housing and other private needs, the total 
could top $56 billion a year, according to the institute. "). According to another source, 
Meanwhile, welfare payments on the reservation have increased by 25 percent over 
the past two years, as tribal members who have lost jobs on the outside return home. 
At the same time, Federal money available to the tribal government for job training 
and development programs has declined by more than 30 percent over the same 
period, to $3.9 million. 
William E. Schmidt, Economy Carves New Trail o/Tears/or Tribe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,1983, at 
AI; COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FuNDING 
AND UNMET NEEDS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 9 (2003) (noting that at least $2.8 billion would be 
necessary to meet education and health care needs alone). 
101. Pat Beall, Exiled Seminoles Meet Resistance to Bingo Plan, WALL ST.J., Aug. 7, 1996, 
at FI. 
102. Jim VandeHei, American Indians Gamble on GOP, WALL ST.J., Apr. 11,2002, at A4. 
103. Lewis Kamb, Tribe is Ready to Roll-Its Own; Squaxins Leverage Tax Break Into a 
Smoking Business, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 19,2004, at AI, available at 2004 WL 
60138167. 
104. See id. 
105. Few commentators in this area even ask these questions. They assume one method or 
paradigm is the right one and proceed from there. Professor Frank Pommersheim refused to 
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do tribes exist merely to make money. However, some tribes may form 
businesses that intend to maximize profit, money that is then returned to the 
tribal government or to tribal members through a per capita payment. 106 
Some tribes do a little of both: profit maximizing and job creation.l07 
Unfortunately, most tribes are not in the position to market a very profitable 
enterprise and resort to operating businesses merely as a public employment 
project. 
It is typical for privatization and deregulation pundits to complain 
about the lack of productivity on tribal trust lands, implicitly or explicitly 
blaming "socialism" or "communism" or "communalism."108 These pun-
dits cite statistics that show "productivity" of agricultural trust land is 90% 
less productive than land owned by for-profit businesses, without actually 
noting that most trust land is arid and non-irrigable.l09 Like James Watt in 
the early 1980s,11O some analysts wish to open up tribal land to private 
investment without much regard for the wishes and needs of tribal 
governments and individual Indians.1l1 
The question of whether a tribal government is capitalist or socialist is 
one that has confounded Indian law scholars and policymakers for 
assume anything and asked these questions two decades ago. See Frank Pommersheim, Economic 
Development in Indian Country: What Are the Questions?, 12 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 195 (l984); 
see also FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 162-87 (l995) (amending the article a 
decade later). 
106. E.g., GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA & CHIPPEWA INDIANS REVENUE 
ALLOCATION ORDINANCE, 18 GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CODE ch. 16, available at 
http://doc.narf.org/nill/Codes/gtcode/travcodeI8bgaming.htm (last visited January II, 2oo5). 
107. The gaming enterprises of the Hoopa Valley Tribe, for example, are modest and mostly 
serve as a job-creation program for tribal members. See Padraic I. McCoy, The Land Must Hold 
the People: Native Modes of Territoriality and Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Placing 
Land Indian Trust Through 25 C.F.R. Part 151,27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, (2oo2-2003) (noting 
that the Hoopa Valley Tribe's gaming consists of "tiny card rooms and bingo halls"). 
108. See Associated Press, Watt Apologizes to Indians for Any 'Hurt' From Socialism 
Remarks, N.Y. nMES, Jan. 26, 1983, at Al3. 
109. See Terry L. Anderson, How the Government Keeps Indians in Poverty, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 22, 1995, at AIO ("Indeed, a study of agricultural land on a large-cross section of Western 
reservation indicates that tribal trust land is 80% to 90% less productive."). 
110. See generally Williams, supra note 97, arguing that, 
The Reagan administration's policy is premised principally upon the simplistic yet 
chimerical belief that the "avenue of development for many tribes" lies in the sup-
posedly abundant natural resources underlying land that the nineteenth century 
American government regarded as useless. Unfortunately, such a policy ignores the 
fact that fewer than one in eight Indian Nations has energy and mineral reserves that 
can be developed. In the minds of many Indian leaders and their people, federal poli-
cies premised upon such a belief implicitly condone a neocolonial status for those 
tribes fortuitously sitting atop strategic mineral and energy stockpiles. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
111. See Anderson, supra note 109, at AIO ("Somehow, the productive success that private 
property makes possible must be made available to all Native Americans."). 
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decades. 1l2 For the average M.B.A. schooled in for-profit enterprises, it is 
shocking to see a business controlled by a tribal government. One com-
mentator said, "You didn't realize there was a socialist government in the 
middle of America, did yoU?"113 But as we learned so often in the movies, 
communism or socialism is a red herring. 114 As tribes develop their own 
governmental and business capacity and techniques, they are often held 
back by the simple fact that many tribes had no organization to learn from 
except the federal government, and tribal governments have consistently 
"remade themselves in the image of the Federal bureaucracy."1l5 It is not 
economic theory that holds tribes back; it is the fact that their role models 
were also their oppressors. 
Regardless of a tribe's model (or lack thereof), economic development 
has been and will remain a mainstay of Indian policy. Prior to gaming, 
tribes tried many other kinds of businesses. I 16 The purpose of establishing 
these businesses was to develop "their own commercial ventures as a way 
of escaping the squalor and hardship to which many have become inured 
since the white man began his massive westward migration .... "117 Private 
investors rarely come to the reservation. I 18 For tribes in resource-poor, arid 
regions, particularly in the west, economic development is extraordinarily 
112. Compare Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism 
or Socialism Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 856 (2001) (concluding that "a private free market 
economy looks well suited to the history and cultures of most tribes; better in fact than does the 
'socialism' of tribal governments monopolizing and directing business activity in Indian 
country"), with Raymond Cross, De-Federalizing American Indian Commerce: Toward a New 
Political Economy for Indian Country, 16 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'y 445, 492 (1993) (concluding 
that "restoration of tribal authority and control over resources and legal relationships is a 
necessary step toward making tribal self-sufficiency and autonomy a working reality within Indian 
Country"). 
I envision the dominant economic paradigm in Indian Country to closely parallel what some 
intellectuals have called "libertarian socialism" or "anarcho-syndicalism," similar to the syndi-
cated farms in pre-Spanish Civil War Catalonia and envisioned, but never realized, in the Israeli 
kibbutzim. No commentator has developed such a theory for Indian Country, but I believe it may 
be an ideal fit for several reasons that I intend to expound upon in a future article. 
113. Michael Winerip, lump-Starting Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,1994, § 4A, at 25. 
114. See CLUE (Paramount Studio 1985). 
115. Winerip, supra note 113, § 4A, at 25; see also Robert A. Hamilton, Connecticut Q&A: 
Patrice Kunesh; Defining How a Tribe Governs Its Land, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1995, § l3CN, at 
3 ("Tribal governments under the [Indian Reorganization] Act see themselves more as puppets of 
the Secretary of the Interior .... "). 
116. Winerip, supra note 113, §4A. at 25. 
117. Id. 
118. judith Valenta. A Century Later. Sioux Still Struggle. And Still Are Losing. WALL ST. J .• 
Mar. 25. 1991, at Al ("Few businesses are willing to venture onto the reservations. There are no 
banks. In fact. there are only 14 private businesses on the reservation: two gas stations. one hair-
dresser and 11 small grocery stores. There are few paved roads. "); Schmidt. supra note 100, at Al 
("Despite efforts to encourage private investors to come in, there has been no private industry on 
the reservation since a sawmill closed two years ago."). 
HeinOnline -- 80 N.D. L. Rev. 778 2004
778 NORTH DAKOTA LA W REVIEW [VOL. 80:759 
difficult. 119 Many tribal businesses fail. 120 The San Carlos Apache Tribe, 
for example, saw cosmetics, tourism, and timber concerns fail in the early 
1980s.121 The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead 
Reservation saw its hot-springs resort and modular housing businesses fail 
over time. 122 Before gaming, the Mashantucket Pequot Nation "tried vari-
ous enterprises on the reservation-a swine farm, maple syrup production, 
sale of firewood. All failed."123 
Some tribes raise revenue through the natural resources present on their 
reservation lands, such as oil and gas.l 24 Some estimates place sixty per-
cent of the United States' energy resources on tribal land.l25 The Council 
of Energy Resources Tribes, founded in 1975 by twenty-five tribes and 
described (insanely in my view) by the New York Times as an American 
Indian version of OPEC, "played a vital role in providing technical 
assistance and information to Indian tribes on resource development. "126 
119. See James P. Sweeney, New Indian Land Rules Pose Quandary, SAN DIEGO UNlON-
TRIB., Oct. 15,2001, at BI, available at 2001 WL 27294810, explaining, 
"Y ou have to understand the desire for Indian tribes in California to acquire land in a 
historical context," [Howard Dickstein, tribal attorney] said. "Not only was 99 percent 
of their original land base taken away, but the I percent that was left was in many 
cases taken away in the Termination period of the 1950s and '60s. The land bases that 
they have for the most part . .. are not useful for many purposes." 
Id. (emphasis added). See also Michael Gartner, Viewpoint: Indian Tribes Shouldn't Bet Their 
Future on Casinos, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1990, at A IS, cautioning that, 
"I don't see Ford Motor Co. coming out here to build a plant," Donald LaPoint, tribal 
chairman [of the Santee Sioux Tribe] .... "What ... are we supposed to do" to find 
prosperity? The tribe's reservation is in an isolated area of northeastern Nebraska, ISO 
miles from Council Bluffs, and most of the 500 or so Indians still on the land live in 
poverty. 
Id. (second italics in original). See also Schmidt, supra note 100, at AI, stating, 
Id. 
Part of the problem is that the San Carlos reservation is a spare landscape, without the 
natural resources of other tribes. In contrast, the White Mountain Apache, whose 
lands lie adjacent to San Carlos on the north, are much better off economically 
because of their rich stands of timber and mountains that are now one of Arizona's 
most popular winter ski areas. 
120. Schmidt, supra note 100, at AI. 
121. Id. 
122. See Dan Morse, Tribal Pursuit: The Salish-Kootenai Tribe Has Succeeded Where 
Others Have Failed; Its Secret; Think Business, Not Bureaucracy, WALL ST. 1., Mar. 27,2002, at 
16. 
123. Micah Morrison, Casino Royale: The Foxwoods Story, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21,2001, at 
A18. 
124. E.g., Indian Tribe Offering Is Held, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,1985, § D, at 15 (reporting that 
the Jicarilla Apache Tribe secured a bond offering with its oil and gas revenues). 
125. See William A. Means, Letter to the Editor, The Government's Bad Deal for u.s. 
Indians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,1983, § 4, at 16. 
126. William E. Schmidt, Navajos May Quit Indian 'OPEC' Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 
1982, at 36 (citing John Echohawk, head of the Native American Rights Fund). 
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Even with vast resources available on the reservation, most tribes have been 
unable to control the exploitation of their resources by non-Indian firms.l 27 
The so-called Hopi-Navajo land dispute arose when the federal government 
artificially divided Hopi and Navajo land in order to make it easier for its 
constituent coal companies to exploit tribal resources. 128 The Crow Tribe 
of Montana, as of approximately ten years ago, still could manage only a 
"shockingly low 0.01% rate of return per year" on its $26 billion coal 
reserves. 129 
Probably the most successful tribe marketing its natural resources is the 
Southern Ute tribe in Colorado.l 3o Based on its fossil fuels ventures, the 
tribe "is a conglomerate with $1.45 billion in assets, making it one of the 
richest tribes in history and one of the few whose wealth doesn't hinge on 
gambling."\31 Part of the tribe's wealth is distributed in per capita pay-
ments: "Once a year, the tribe splits 10% of its profits among the 600 
members between 26 and 60 years old; elders get $54,500 apiece annu-
ally." 1,32 The tribe "pulled in $100 million on profits from their gas-
production company ... [and] collected half of all the natural-gas royalties 
paid to Indian tribes."133 
Other tribes can raise revenue through the exercise of their retained 
treaty rights in fishing,134 although the tribal governments do not 
127. See. e.g., Bob Gottlieb & Peter Wiley, Hopis. Navajos and King Coal, WALL ST. 1., 
July II, 1986, at A20 (discussing conflicts between the Hopi Tribe's government, the Navajo 
people, and coal companies). 
Id. 
128. See id. According to the Wall Street Journal: 
Historically, the establishment of both tribal governments was tied to mineral leasing. 
The Navajo tribal government was set up in the 1920s to facilitate oil leasing. The 
Hopi tribal government was a virtual creation of the late John Boyden, former tribal 
counsel and a Salt Lake City attorney, again for the purpose of signing mineral leases. 
Most Hopis preferred their traditional form of government led by village religious 
leaders, and many still refuse to recognize the tribal government. 
Peabody [Coal]'s Black Mesa mine, in particular, led to a long and bitter struggle 
between traditional Hopis and Navajos and their white environmentalist allies on one 
hand, and supporters of the tribal governments and coal leasing on the other. In secret 
negotiations, tribal attorney Boyden convinced both the Hopi and Navajo tribal 
governments that coal was central to their economic development. Many traditional 
Hopis and Navajos believed that strip mining would bring about the desecration of 
sacred lands on Black Mesa. 
129. Anderson, supra note 109, at A 10. 
130. See Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Indian Affairs: A Business Empire Transforms Life for 




134. See. e.g., Tu, supra note 84, at 1, reporting, 
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necessarily tax the income of their members.l 35 Some tribes have attempted 
to raise revenue through the taxation of non-Indian-owned businesses 
operating on reservation or trust lands. 136 Other tribes have leased their 
retained water rights to create revenue streams from actual streams.137 
And then there is gaming. Tribes have developed a vastly creative 
cumulative output of economic development projects, but gaming is 
foremost. Indian gaming began in New York and Florida in the 1970s. The 
Seminole Tribe of Florida "established a 5,600-seat bingo parlour in 
southern Florida in 1979 .... "138 Tribal smoke shops and bingo palaces did 
not arise in a vacuum. 139 Gaming gained credence in large part because the 
federal government actively encouraged Indian tribes to build gaming halls 
in the 1980s.l40 In 2002, Indian gaming took in $14.5 billion. 141 
[T]he S'Klallam have begun to focus more on their specialty-seafood business, called 
Jamestown Seafood .... The operation-which also produces some (1,000 gallons of 
oysters a month,] 400,000 pounds of geoducks, 200,000 pounds of crabs and up to 
50,000 pounds of dams a year- has gross sales so far this year of about $2 million. 
Id .. See also Wallace Turner, Salmon Sales Tax: Is Tribe Exempt?, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1986, 
at 22 (noting that the Lummi Tribe's "salmon fishery income is about $11 million" and that the 
Washington tribes "catch about $600 million worth of salmon a year"). 
135. See Barry Siegel, Tribes Seek to Govern Non-Members; Indians' New Powers Bring 
Gains. Conflicts, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1986, available at 1986 WL 2197630 ("Sportsmen like 
how they jump when they're reeled in. To Indians, it's food."). 
136. See Rachel Zimmerman, Locke Referees Feud Over Tax on Reservations, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 2, 2000, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3016298. 
137. See Robert Tomsho, States. Indians Seek Settlement of Water Issues, WALL ST. 1., Nov. 
25, 1992, at B I ("Moreover, a few settlements have created new revenue streams by allowing the 
tribes to lease unused water to others."). 
138. David Owen, Indians Dealing On New Terms, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Apr. 14, 
1987, at 6. 
139. See Associated Press, Reagan Signs Bill Regulating Indian Gambling, Oct. 17, 1988, 
available at 1988 WL 3817253 ("Indian tribes, faced with cutbacks in federal money and a 
limited tax base, have instituted gambling operations to raise needed revenues."); United Press 
International, 2 Indian Tribes Look at Bingo As Answer to Financial Needs, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD (Neb.), June 20, 1984, available at 1984 WL 2523858 ("Tribal spokesmen said their 
people must do something to remedy their financial ills. They have no tax base to raise revenue, 
an.d ?,overnment funds are dwindling. Bingo offers profits and jobs for the unemployed, they 
satd. ). 
140. See Michael Nelson, The Quest to Be Called a Tribe, LEGAL AFF., Oct. 2003, at 56, 57, 
daming, 
To reduce the tribes' reliance on federal funds (if not out of concern for Indian rights), 
Republican presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford subsidized economic 
development on the reservations. When the initial beads-and-pots enterprises failed to 
make real money, the Reagan Administration encouraged the tribes to spend their 
subsidies on bingo halls. 
Id.; see also. e.g .• California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
141. Marie Price, Indian Gaming Wins Big Bucks, TULSA WORLD (Okla.), Jan. 30,2004, at 
A19. 
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Gaming revenues are critical for Indian tribes that are within a gaming 
market. In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,142 the Supreme 
Court recognized that, 
The Cabazon and Morongo Reservations contain no natural re-
sources which can be exploited. The tribal games at present pro-
vide the sole sources of revenues for the operation of the tribal 
governments and the provision of tribal services. They are also the 
major sources of employment on the reservations. Self-determi-
nation and economic development are not within reach if the 
Tribes cannot raise revenues and provide employment for their 
members. 143 
Other courts have acknowledged the importance of gaming revenues for the 
provision of tribal government services. The Kansas Supreme Court noted, 
"[Indian gaming] income often means the difference between an adequate 
governmental program and a skeletal program that is totally dependent on 
Federal funding."I44 
In addition to funding governmental services, gaming operations 
provide critical employment opportunities for tribal members l45 and non-
members l46 alike, reducing the burden on state social services.l47 A federal 
trial court noted the success of the Turtle Creek Casino, owned and 
operated by the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, in 
its findings of fact after a trial where the State of Michigan attempted to 
shut down the casino: 
142. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
143. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 218-19. 
144. State ex rei. Stephen v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Kan. 1992) (quoting Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act, S. Rep. 446, looth Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1988»; see also Am. Greyhound 
Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1063 (D. Ariz. 2001) (finding that gaming revenues 
allow tribes to fund housing and infrastructure projects), rev'd on other grounds, 305 F.3d 1015 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
145. See, e.g .. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 743 
F. Supp. 645, 646 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (noting that eighty percent of employees at casino were tribal 
members). 
146. See, e.g., Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 1069 n.4 
(N.Y.) (Read, J., dissenting) (stating that Oneida Indian Nation's casino employed 3,300 people), 
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1017 (2003); Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How 
IGRA Shapes the Politics oJ.Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOc. 
POL'y & L. 381,402,404 (1997) (noting that Indian gaming created 10,000 jobs in Minnesota 
and 140,000 in the United States overall). 
147. See, e.g., Sherry M. Thompson, The Return of the Buffalo: An Historical Survey of 
Reservation Gaming in the United States, II ARIZ. 1. INT'L & COMPo L. 520, 522 n.7 (1994) 
("[T]he number of people on welfare on four rural reservations in Minnesota dropped sixteen 
percent after casinos were opened."). Cj. Kathryn R.L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the 
Plains: Assessing the Success of Indian Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 47, 76 (2002) ("[E]ven 
relatively modest casino revenues and levels of casino employment benefit surrounding non-
Indian communities, as well as the state economy."). 
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In fiscal year 200 I, Turtle Creek provided approximately 89% of 
the Band's gaming revenue. The casino now employs approxi-
mately 500 persons, approximately half of whom are tribal mem-
bers. Revenues from the Turtle Creek Casino also fund 
approximately 270 additional tribal government positions, which 
administer a variety of governmental programs, including health 
care, elder care, child care, youth services, education, housing, 
economic development and law enforcement. The casino also pro-
vides some of the best employment opportunities in the region, 
and all of its employees are eligible for health insurance benefits, 
disability benefits and 401(k) benefit plans. The casino also pro-
vides revenues to regional governmental entities and provides 
significant side benefits to the local tourist economy.l48 
Gaming is not profitable for all tribes. These tribes have no choice but 
to try something else. The Lummi Tribe's casino "had been unprofit-
able ... and getting rid of it allowed the tribe to devote energy to [economic 
development] alternatives."149 
Many successful gaming tribes are attempting to diversify their 
economic development portfolio in the anticipation that gaming revenues 
will decline over time.l5o "Now some tribes are expanding into energy, 
banks, hotels, ski resorts, meat-processing plants and cement factories."151 
The Mashantucket Pequot Nation, for a time, operated a pharmaceutical 
distribution system that "generate[d] more than $15 million in reve-
nue .... "152 The Tulalip Tribe "own[s] and operate[s] a marine, a cable-
148. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. United States Attorney for the 
w. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (W.D. Mich. 2002), aff'd, 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 
2004); see also L. Renee Liuex, Split. Double Down. or Hit Me: An Analysis of the 1993 and 
1998 Class III Michigan Gaming Compacts, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 853 (1999) (discussing 
positive aspects of Indian gaming in Michigan); Thomas L. Wilson, Indian Gaming and Economic 
Development on the Reservation, 68 MICH. B. J. 380 (1997) (same); Brief of Amici Curiae Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians et al. at 11-26, Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos 
v. State, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004) (No. 122830) (same). 
149. Tu, supra note 84, at I. 
150. E.g., Tribes Are Looking Beyond Casinos to Build an Economic Base, N.Y. TiMES, 
Nov. 12, 1999, at 20; Ken Gepfert, Gambling Advocates See Payoff in Cherokee Casino, WALL 
ST. J., July 12, 1995, at I ("But any monopoly might not last. Mr. Taylor predicts the casino 
could eventually prompt North Carolina's politicians to authorize casinos elsewhere in the state. 
'They aren't going to let the Indians do something they can't do,' he says."). 
151. Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Gold Rush: A Former Actress Links Worlds of Wall Street and 
the Reservation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2001, at AI; see also VandeHei, supra note 102, at A4 
("With money in their pockets and visions of greater prosperity, Indian tribes are courting outside 
investors for energy, telecommunication and other ventures. . .. [Tribal business leaders] also 
talked to energy and high-tech firms, and even made a bid to build a stadium for the National 
Football League's Arizona Cardinals on the reservation."). 
152. David M. Herszenhorn, Pequot Tribe Violates Law in Prescription Discount Plan. 
Government Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,2000, § B, at 6. 
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television company and a tobacco shop ... "153 and a very successful, multi-
million dollar business park located on 1-5 north of Seattle. 154 
The Mescalero Apache tribe started a telecommunications business, ski 
resort, elk-hunting grounds, a lumber company, and a resort with a golf 
course, some of them prior to the expansion of gaming.J55 That tribe be-
lieved that the development of an industrial infrastructure would '''attract 
investment in the same wayan emerging market needs to lure foreign 
capital. "'156 As then-Chairman of the Federal Communication Commission 
William E. Kennard noted, '" [when] a tribal government establishes its own 
telephone company, it is creating an economic development nucleus. '" 157 
The Winnebago Tribe in Nebraska has been enormously successful in its 
non-gaming business enterprises, operated under Ho-Chunk Enterprises, 
Inc. (HCI).J58 HCI's "portfolio has grown to include part-ownership of a 
bank and its new used-car dealership, 'Rez-Cars. "'159 The Fort Mojave 
Indians have invested in power plants with gaming revenues.J60 "The Fort 
Mojave plant, perched on a sand dune on the 33,000-acre reservation, 
brings in $4 million a year from Calpine Corp., a San Jose, California-based 
energy firm. That's as much as the two casinos combined."161 The 
Muckleshoot Tribe near Seattle "is building an office park across from its 
casino and has plans for a music amphitheater and a 24-hour fast food 
restaurant to feed hungry gamblers."162 
153. Tu, supra note 84, at I. 
154. See Richard Roesler, Tribes Seek to Keep Part of Sales Tax; Tulalips' Proposal Could 
Affect Many Reservations, SPOKESMAN REv. (Spokane, Wash.), Aug. 1,2001, at AI, available at 
2001 WL 22802140. According to local media reports, 
A retail park is sprouting on the [Tulalip] reservation's eastern edge, along the 
interstate. A Wal-Mart opened there in April; a Home Depot follows in a couple of 
weeks. A small strip mall for a tribal bank and tribal entrepreneurs is in the works, 
with an outlet mall, hotels and convention center planned. 
Id.; Paul Shukovsky, Tribes Reaches for Sales Tax; Tulalips Pursue 'Total Self-Governance,' 
State Revenue to Pay for New City's Services, SEATILE PosT-INTELUGENCER, July 18,2001, at 
B I, available at 200 I WL 3563184. 
ISS. See Simon Romero, Tribe Seeking Phone System As Step to Web, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2000, at AI. 
156. [d. (quoting Godfrey Enjady, general manager of the Mescalero Apache phone 
company). 
157. Id.; see generally Tracey A. LeBeau, Reclaiming Reservation Infrastructure: 
Regulatory and Economic Opportunities for Tribal Development, STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 237 
(Spring 200 1). 
158. See John J. Fialka, Tribe Finds Ways to Create Jobs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,2004, at A4. 
159. Id. 
160. See David L. Greene, Power Plants Sprout on Indian Reservations; Tax Breaks 
Abound; Approval is Routine, BALT. SUN, Mar. 3,2002, at IA. 
161. Id. 
162. Westneat & Simon, supra note 88, available at 1995 WL 11799673. 
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Some tribes have refused to enter into gaming operations, or suffer 
internal political strife from more traditional elements of their memberships 
when they do. The Cherokee Nation, at the time choosing to avoid entering 
into gaming, focused more on small businesses in the 1980s, including a 
restaurant, landscaping, gardening, tourism, poultry, and hydroelectric 
power.I63 The Oklahoma Seminole Tribe was undermined both by the 
Florida Seminoles and from dissenters within the tribe when it sought to 
open a bingo hall in Florida. 164 
Other tribes began economic development without the benefit of large 
gaming revenues. The Mississippi Choctaw are near legendary in their eco-
nomic progress in a very poor area of Mississippi. As of the mid-1990s, the 
tribe's industries had sales of over $100 million and cut its membership's 
unemployment rate to nil. 165 
In spite of these success stories, tribal economic development generally 
fails. The next part of this article discusses why. 
IV. THE BARRIERS AND DANGERS OF RAISING TAX 
REVENUE THROUGH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
"If you want an example of the failures of socialism, don't go to Russia. 
Come to America, and see the American Indian reservations."I66 
Id. 
163. See Owen, supra note 138, at 6. 
164. See Beall, supra note 101, at Fl. According to the Wall Street Journal. 
The nascent controversy has given rise to doubts about the idea among some 
Oklahoma Seminoles. "There's a real sentiment here for going back to the native 
homelands where our ancestors came from, and there's a strong desire to see our 
nation have a place there," says Dan Factor, one of 12 Oklahoma Seminole chiefs in 
Seminole County, Oklahoma. "But not if it's going to be developed into something 
that's going to create hardship or controversy." 
... "[D]isputes among Native Americans over wagering may seem inevitable when 
there's so much money at stake." 
165. See FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: REINVENTING 
NATIVE AMERICANS AT THE END OF THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 303 (1996): 
/d. 
Today, Choctaw factories assemble wire harnesses for Xerox and Navistar, telephones 
for AT&T, and audio speakers for Chrysler, Harley-Davidson, and Boeing. The tribal 
greeting card plant hand-finishes 83 million cards each year. Since 1992, the tribe has 
operated the largest printing plant for direct-mail advertising east of the Mississippi 
River. By 1995, sales from the tribe's industries as a whole had increased to more 
than $ 100 million annually from less than $1 million in 1979. As recently as fifteen 
years ago, 80 percent of the tribe was unemployed; now, having achieved full 
employment for its own members, nearly half the tribe's employees are white and 
black Mississippians. 
166. Reagan Outlines Policy on Tribes, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 25,1983, at A16; see also Schmidt, 
supra note 100, at Al ("Interior Secretary James G. Watt ... said Indian reservations 
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Former Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt famously described 
Indian tribes as an example of the "failures of socialism."167 Many Indian 
leaders and advocates rightfully objected to this characterization of Indian 
tribes,168 The well-documented history of tribal-federal, tribal-state, and 
interpersonal Indian-American relations provides a different version of why 
resource-rich Indian reservations are not wealthy and powerful. I69 And yet 
over ten years later, the New York Times asserted that "the problems facing 
the new Eastern European entrepreneurs struggling to overcome 70 years of 
Communist rule weren't too different from those facing Indians on a reser-
vation, where a central tribal government dominates a heavily planned 
economy."170 
In addition to the state of federal Indian law, there are other artificial 
barriers to economic development in Indian Country, mostly imposed on 
tribes by law or otherwise generated as a side effect of Federal Indian Law. 
It is these artificial barriers that we tum to now. 
A. STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 
IN FINANCING 
Indian tribes are still hamstrung by the lack of financing available to 
stimulate the reservation economy. The first tax-exempt municipal bond 
offering by an Indian tribe in accordance with the Tax Status Act was 
demonstrated the 'failures of socialism' and fostered the nation's highest rates of unemployment, 
alcoholism and other social ills."); Seth S. King, Indian Group Praises Reagan Statement on 
Tribes, N.Y. nMEs, Jan. 29, 1983, § I, at 8 ("In a television interview last week, Mr. Watt said 
Indian reservations offered a better example of the 'failures of socialism' than the Soviet Union 
did."). 
Watt later apologized for his insensitive comments, but added that "his comments had 
focused attention on problems that have been around for decades. 'I have given you an 
opportunity, don't muff it,' Mr. Watt said." Associated Press, supra note 108, at A13. In fact, it 
appeared that Watt's "apology" was nothing of the sort: "Mr. Watt conceded that he might have 
used 'unartfullanguage' in making the comments, but added, grinning, 'boy, I got attention.'" Id. 
167. Reagan Outlines Policy on Tribes, supra note 166, at 16. Watt further added, sounding 
exactly like the advocates of the 1950s-era Termination policy, that, 
[S]ome tribal leaders "are interested in keeping this group of people assembled on a 
desert environment were there are no jobs, no agricultural potential, no water, because 
if Indians were allowed to be liberated, they'd go and get a job and that guy wouldn't 
have his handout as a paid government Indian official." 
Id. Compare Schmidt, supra note 100, at AI, stating, 
Here on the reservation, where many Apaches heard the Interior Secretary on 
television, Mr. Watt's remarks stirred deep-seated mistrust of the Federal Government 
once again. It is a decades-old fear that Washington's real purpose is to do away with 
the reservation eventually, to drive the Indians off the land where they were forcibly 
resettled nearly a century ago .... 
168. Id. 
169. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES (1970). 
170. Winerip, supra note 113, § 4A, at 25. 
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announced In 1985.171 More and more tax-exempt financings followed, 
albeit slowly. Lenders forced tribes to pledge their limited gaming reve-
nues and anticipated government funds and still could not participate in the 
tax-exempt financing projects. J72 To advance the spread of tribal financ-
ings, some of the more wealthy tribes formed the Native American National 
Bank in 2000.173 The founders of the Bank suggested that commercial 
banks '" are a little fearful of giving Indians loans. "'174 By 1995, the 
Mohegan Tribe had become the first Indian tribe to raise money on Wall 
Street by partly financing the deal with an institutional placing on capital 
markets. 175 By the first years of the new century, large banks began to lend 
to Indian tribes flush with casino revenue. 176 Despite these advances, even 
by the tum of the century, many tribal governments still were forced to rely 
on "high-yield bankers" and "junkbond financing."177 "Relying on a single 
source of funding-as profitable as it may be- [tribes] rarely meet criteria 
for investment-grade ratings."178 
Tribal governments are "treated differently from local governments 
under federal tax and securities laws .... "179 The legal presumption re-
garding tribal financing is that it is taxable unless the tribe shows that the 
funded project is for some "essential government function."180 State and 
local governments do not have to make the same showing. 181 Also, the 
17!. See Indian Tribe Offering Is Held, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1985, at DI5 (reporting that the 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe held the first tax-exempt offering by an Indian tribe, an offering of $30.2 
million secured by the tribe's oil and gas revenues). 
172. E.g., Richard Gibson, Indians Sell Bonds Backed By Revenue from Bingo Betting, 
WALL ST. J., June 19, 1985, available at 1985 WL-WSJ 249499 (discussing the Fond du Lac 
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians' private bank financing of its health clinic). 
173. See Paul Zielbauer, Tribes Agree to Underwrite Proposal for Nation's Largest Indian 
Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,2000, at B1. 
174. Id. (quoting Greg Bourland, chairman of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe). 
175. See Tim Burt, Indian Tribe Joins Casino Venture, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct. 3, 
1995, at 26. 
176. See Dugan, supra note 151, at AI, discussing interests of Morgan Stanley, Bank of 
America Corp., and others in lending to Indian tribes: 
Id. 
Bank of America entered the market in the mid-l990s, at the suggestion of Dan Lewis, 
a senior vice president who is Navajo. "I pointed out that if we can lend to foreign 
countries, we can certainly overcome the issues keeping banks out of Indian country," 
Mr. Lewis recalls. "For one thing, we know tribes are not going to devalue the dol-
lar." Since then, the bank has lent $1.5 billion in syndicated loans for tribal casinos. It 
routinely runs buses of bankers through reservations in California to interest them in 
investments. 




18!. See id. 
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Securities Act of 1933 "requires tribes but not state or local govern-
ments ... to register public offerings."182 According to the Wall Street 
Journal, "[b]ecause registering bonds would be prohibitively expensive, 
most tribal financing has come from bank loans or privately placed bonds, 
which are exempt from the [S]ecurities [A]Ct."183 In addition to statutory 
and regulatory barriers, the Supreme Court has followed the prodding of 
state governments and sharply limited the ability of Indian tribes to exploit 
their tax advantages for business purposes. 184 
Another major hurdle tribes must face is capital flight. "Because most 
tribal communities do not have a comprehensive economic structure, tribal 
dollars are spent mainly in non-Indian communities where they support the 
tax base of these neighboring local governments."185 In Navajo, for exam-
ple, members "receive paychecks and Government assistance totaling $1 
billion a year, and spend an estimated $800 million of it outside the 
reservation." 186 
B. COMMON LAW LIMITS ON THE ABILITY TO "MARKET THE 
EXEMPTION" 
"As tribes become more of an economic presence in a state, they are 
competing with the state in many respects, and the state wants to see how 
far it can extend its regulatory jurisdiction on the reservation."187 The most 
common argument behind extending the reach of state taxes or regulations 
is to "level the playing field."188 
182. Id. 
183. Id.; see also Dennis Walters, Standard & Poor's Announces Its First Public Rating on 
Indian Bond Issue, BOND BUYER, Apr. 30, 1993, available at 1993 WL 7137018 ("Unlike state 
and local government bonds, tribal bonds are not exempt from registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. As a result, most tribal bonds are either privately placed or secured with a 
letter of credit to avoid the often time-consuming and expensive nature of the registration 
process. "). 
184. E.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980) (denying tribes' ability to market a tax exemption to the advantage of state governments). 
185. Tax Fairness and Tax Base Protection: Hearing on H.R. 1168 Before the House 
Comm. on Resources, 105th Congo (1998) [hereinafter Hearing I (statement of Kevin Gover, 
Assistant Sec'y of Indian Affairs, United States Dept. of Interior), available at 1998 WL 
12761658. 
186. Keith Bradsher, In Navajos' Towns, A New Tactic to Fill A Void in Banking, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994, at AI. 
187. Hamilton, supra note 115, § 13CN, at 3. 
188. See Westneat & Simon, supra note 88, available at 1995 WL 11799673 ("The common 
argument behind all these tax proposals is a desire to 'level the playing field' between tribal 
businesses-whether they're casinos or smoke shops-and nearby non-Indian ventures that must 
pay state and federal taxes."). "Leveling the playing field" is an old argument used by the 
dominant culture in other areas of public policy. See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING 
As FREE SPEECH viii (1994). As Stanley Fish pointed out in the context of the Congressional 
redistricting, 
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States routinely object to tax-free tribal sales of cigarettes to non-
Indians, known as "tax arbitrage" or, in federal Indian law, as "marketing 
the exemption."189 In 2002, the conservative Financial Times implicitly 
compared Indian tribes to New York City gangsters,l90 although the paper 
conceded that cigarette smokers strongly support Indian tribes who provide 
them with cheaper product.l91 
The Supreme Court first explicitly decided that tribes could not 
"market the exemption" in Washington v. Confederated Tribes and Bands 
of the Colville Indian Reservation. 192 The Court held that, 
/d. 
What these smokes hops offer the customers, and what is not 
available elsewhere, is solely an exemption from state taxation. 
The Tribes assert the power to create such exemptions by impos-
ing their own taxes or otherwise earning revenues by participating 
in the reservation enterprises. If this assertion were accepted, the 
Tribes could impose a nominal tax and open chains of discount 
stores at reservation borders, selling goods of all descriptions at 
deep discounts and drawing customers from surrounding areas. 
We do not believe that principles of federal Indian law, whether 
stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or other-
wise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from 
I would expect that from many readers the most distressing thing about these essays 
will be the skepticism with which they view the invocation of high-sounding words 
and phrases like "reason," "merit," "fairness," "neutrality," "free speech," "color 
blind," "level playing field," and "tolerance." My argument is that when such words 
and phrases are invoked, it is almost always as part of an effort to deprive moral and 
legal problems of their histories so that merely formal calculations can then be 
performed on phenomena that have been flattened out and no longer have their real-
world shape. An exemplary (it is a bad example) instance of this practice has just 
been provided for us by the Supreme Court in its recent (June 28, 1993) decision that 
the creation by the North Carolina legislature of two black majority districts may be 
unconstitutional because it smacks too much of "race consciousness." 
189. Amity Shlaes, Cigarette Tax Adds Fuel to an Old Fire, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 
Oct. 17, 2002, at 22. 
[d. 
190. [d. According to the Financial Times of London, 
Taxes always generate tax avoidance and tax evasion. And when it comes to cigarette 
taxes, New York has a grand tradition. In the old days-especially between 1965 and 
1980, when cigarette taxes were also high-cigarette bootlegging was a big New York 
business. As much as 25 percent of the cigarette market was underground; organized 
crime managed the business, selling cigarettes at certain exit ramps or in dark 
apartment hallways. 
191. See id. ("States don't like this idea much, and have occasionally taken the tribes to 
court to make them collect sales taxes for them. The states have tended to win these legal battles. 
Still, both ... know that the tribes tend to win the battle in the court of public opinion."). 
192. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
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state taxation to persons who would normally do their business 
elsewhere. 193 
The Court repeated this doctrine in later cases.l94 
789 
However, tribes may "market the exemption" if they can prove that 
they have added value to a product from the reservation, or, in other words, 
created "reservation-based value."195 As the Wall Street Journal described 
a California regulation defining reservation-based value, "Indian retailers 
will be exempt from sales tax if they make a 'substantial contribution' to 
the product, or if the product has a 'substantial connection' to the retailer 
through financing, manufacturing or marketing."I96 The Squaxin Island 
Tribe recently began to market their own brand of cigarettes in order to take 
advantage of this doctrine.l97 
C. BACKLASH AGAINST TRIBAL BUSINESS, PARTICULARLY GAMING 
"When the status quo of the last 100 years is disrupted, someone's ox 
gets gored. "198 
There is a long history of non-Indians complaining vigorously about 
the so-called tax exemptions l99 that many Indian tribes, individual Indians, 
and Indian-owned businesses enjoy.200 As one commentator noted, 
"Indians are a good whipping boy because they don't pay taxes or get 
regulated."2ol Business papers like the Wall Street Journal devote a great 
deal of space to local governments who, often unrealistically or unreason-
ably, fear they will lose sales and property tax revenue.202 Congressional 
193. Colville, 447 U.S. at ISS. 
194. See Dept. of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 71-72 (1994). 
195. See Hamilton, supra note liS, § 13CN, at 3 ("Whatever resources the tribe produces on 
its own land are not taxable."). 
196. Editorial, Casino Royale Politics, WALL ST. J., May 30,2002, at A14. 
197. See Kamb, supra note 103, at AI ("Bolstered by an investment from its successful 
casino-and a competitive tax advantage for Indian manufacturing ventures-the Squaxin Island 
Tribe is betting there will be many more smokers ... willing to give the tribe's new, inexpensive 
brand of cigarettes a try."). 
198. Siegel, supra note 135, available at 1986 WL 2197630. 
199. See generally JAY VINCENT WHITE, TAXING THOSE THEY FOUND HERE: AN 
EXAMINA nON OF THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1972). 
200. See Patricia Callahan, Indians vs. Whites: The Politics of Race Roil a Quiet County, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 31,2002, at AI ("The white establishment in Bennett County[, South Dakota] 
argues that the issue is less about race than about representation without taxation. . .. 'If they're 
going to use your roads and use your schools, they should pay taxes,' says Ed Risse .... "). 
201. Ken Geppfert, Gambling Advocates See Payoff in Cherokee Casino, WALL ST. J., July 
12,1995, at I. 
202. See Dugan, supra note 130, at A I, stating, 
The taxes paid on gas that comes out of the [Southern Ute 1 reservation account for a 
quarter of the taxes in La Plata County, where the tribe is now the biggest employer. 
HeinOnline -- 80 N.D. L. Rev. 790 2004
790 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:759 
leaders often claim the sky is falling when it comes to Indian tax exemp-
tions, sometimes even accusing tribes that market the exemption of being 
criminal tax evaders: 
Any business can reduce its prices dramatically if they simply 
ignore the laws on how they and competitors must operate. It is 
wrong to let law-breakers profit, while those who follow the law 
are driven out of business because they cannot compete against 
law-breakers. Omitting taxes from the price enables anyone to un-
dercut competitors dramatically. The steep discount price is a 
powerful lure attracting customers from nearby non-tribal busi-
nesses (and even from great distances). Thus, the tribes can sell 
gasoline without charging the typical $.20 - .30 per gallon state 
fuel tax or the $.40 - .60 per pack cigarette tax. They even flaunt 
this by advertising to general public that they don't collect 
taxes. . .. The first problem is that this drives legitimate, tax-
paying competition out of business for miles around. The second 
problem is that it destroys the tax base that states and cities use to 
finance roads, schools, parks, housing, public health and safety 
etc.203 
Some states, such as Idaho, have proposed taxes on reservation sales in 
order to try to abate state budget problems.204 Tribes argue that such taxes 
would reduce reservation sales, which also hurt the state imposing the 
taxes.205 Some tribal leaders suspect that state governments, accountable to 
large special interests such as convenience store and tobacco lobbies, are 
basically paid to try and shut down tribal smokeshops.206 Fortunately, there 
Id. 
But the tribe doesn't pay property taxes on land within the bounds of the reservation, 
and area residents fear the tribe will pull land off the tax rolls as it snaps up real estate. 
203. Hearing, supra note 185 (statement of Rep. Ernest J. Istook, Jr.,), available at 1998 WL 
12761802. 
204. See Betsy Z. Russell, Tribes Say Tax Bills Single Them Out Unfairly; One Would 
Impose Cigarette Tax; Another Would Revoke Sales Tax Exemption, SPOKESMEN REV. (Spokane, 
Wash.), Feb. 18,2003, at AI, available at 2003 WL 6401149; see also Amy Lane, State Looks to 
Indian Casinos to Add Revenue, CRAIN'S DEY. BUS., Apr. 14, 2003, at 6 (discussing how 
Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm and the Michigan legislature "are looking to Michigan's 
American Indian tribes as potential revenue sources"). See generally Larry Echohawk, Balancing 
State and Tribal Power to Tax in Indian Country,40 IDAHO L. REV. 623 (2004) (discussing the 
Idaho legislature's proposed solution to its budget dilemma and the impact on Indian tribes). 
205. See Russell, supra note 204, at A I (noting that Idaho tribal leaders argued that state 
taxes on reservation sales would reduce overall state tax and tobacco settlement revenue by $9 
million annually). 
206. See Marie Price, Smoke Shop Owners Fear Getting Burned, TULSA WORLD (Okla.) 
Sept. 28, 2003, at A21 ("[Wayne] Stull[, a Delaware Tribal Council Member] also believes the 
state is in league with big tobacco to put individually operated smoke shops out of business."). 
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are some states, like Washington, that do not see a problem, as long as the 
tribe manufactures its own smokes.207 
The backlash from businesses (and non-Indian governments) 
competing with tribal businesses has been fierce. The state government 
frequently litigates against Ho-Chunk Industries, Inc., the business arm of 
the Winnebago Tribe in Nebraska, on the company's attempts to "use the 
Indians' tribal sovereignty and the latent buying power that provides to 
undercut [its] competitors.''208 
The backlash against tribes for attempting to raise revenue by taxing 
non-Indians is at least as fierce. On the Yakama Reservation in Washington 
state, where the tribe has attempted to tax non-Indian owned businesses 
within the reservation boundaries, business owners (owners that sell enor-
mous amounts of tobacco and alcohol to Indians) frequently complain that 
the tribal government's taxes will drive them out of business,209 On the 
Crow Tribe's reservation, where non-Indian traders sell millions of dollars 
worth of trinkets commemorating Custer's Last Stand, the tribe imposed a 
small sales tax on the traders, who quickly rebelled,2IO 
Non-Indian phone companies have complained about tribes entering 
the telecommunications market. One dispute between a tribe and a non-
Indian firm resulted in the tribe purchasing the local telecommunications 
207. See Kamb, supra note 103, at A I ("We don't have an issue with it,' says Leslie 
Cushman, the [Washington revenue] department's assistant director of special programs and tribal 
liaison. 'They've invested in business, they've bought the equipment, and they'll do the 
manufacturing on Indian land. That pre-empts the tax on non-Indians. "'). 
208. Fialka, supra note 158, at A4. 
209. See Zimmerman, supra note 136, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3016298 ("[The] owner 
of Little John's, a tavern ducked behind a Safeway store in Toppenish, hung this banner over the 
bar: 'Due to the imposed alcohol tax passed by the Yakama Nation Tribal Council, we will not be 
able to offer you Happy Hour until further notice. "'). 
2\0. See Timothy Egan, Backlash Growing as Indians Make a Stand for Sovereignty, N.Y. 
nMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at AI: 
Id. 
Tourists drive over Crow roads, they dump garbage on Crow lands, they get into 
disputes that involve Crow police. But until 1995, when the Crow started levying a 4 
percent resort tax on businesses catering to tourists within the reservation, the tribe 
was getting little revenue from the millions of people who wanted to see where the 
man the Indians called Yellow Hair made his last stand. 
The Crow were making a stand for sovereignty, and for economic survival. But 
many non-Indians on the reservation did not see it that way. They saw it as taxation 
without representation, and have refused to pay. 
"I didn't persecute anybody at Plymouth Rock," says James Thompson, a tax 
opponent who owns Custer Battlefield Trading Company, just a stone's throw from 
where 2\0 soldiers fell. "This is the 1990's. We didn't do anything to them, and we 
don't owe them anything." 
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network from the firm under threat of tribal condemnation of the network, 
which was likely located on trust lands.211 
But none of this compares to the most recent backlash, the national 
backlash against Indian gaming. This backlash is fierce and literally threat-
ens all Indian gaming. Many Indians believe the backlash from the non-
Indians is a product of "simple racism."212 Whatever the cause for these 
on-going attitudes against Indian tribal businesses and Indian tribes 
generally, the impact on tribal economic development is substantial.213 
Indian tribes attempting to overcome legal and political barriers to 
tribal economic development must also confront and quell internal political 
problems. This barrier is perhaps the most significant in terms of both its 
impact on the bottom line and to the future of Indian tribes. The impacts on 
reservation political stability are real, but it must not be forgotten that 
Indian tribes would never have needed to start businesses if Congress, the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Supreme Court, and the states had treated 
Indian tribes like governments from the start. In my opinion, the next sec-
tion would never have been written but for the racism and colonialism of 
non-Indian governments and individuals. 
D. POLITICAL LIMITATIONS OF INDIAN TRIBES TO ENGAGE IN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Professor Robert A. Williams, Jr. adequately summed up the "tangible 
and intangible barriers" to tribal economic growth in 1985: "[territorial] 
remoteness, an inadequate public infrastructure base, capital access barriers 
and ownership patterns, and an underskilled labor and managerial sector 
combine with paternalistic attitudes of federal policymakers to stifle Indian 
Country development and investment."214 
Indian tribes did not develop as ready-made economic growth 
machines, ready to dominate in business. In fact, most Indian tribes are 
forced to import the values and expertise required to make a profit.215 Still, 
211. See Romero, supra note ISS, at Al (discussing dispute between the Mescalero Apache 
Tribe and the GTE Corporation). 
212. Roesler, supra note 154, at Al ("'You're disliked for being poor, and you're disliked 
even more for being successful,' [Caldie Rogers, president of the Greater Marysville Tulalip 
Chamber of Commerce] said. "). 
213. See id. 
214. Williams, supra note 97, at 335-36 (footnote omitted). 
215. See Associated Press, Tribes Are Looking Beyond Casinos to Build an Economic Base, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1999, at 20 ('''[The tribes] never imagines that they would be negotiating 
with Fortune 500 companies, or with the federal government, trying to build modem economies,' 
[Stephen Cornell] said. 'In many cases, they're not very effective institutions, and they're not 
indigenous, not traditional-they didn't come out of that society. They were imports."). 
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business experts routinely predict that Indian tribal businesses will fall flat 
because of the tribes' relative inexperience in concepts such as market-
ing.216 As the Financial Times argued, "general lack of business skills 
within the tribes, combined with still-powerful mistrust of outsiders, could 
slow expansion [of gaming in California]."217 Even where Indian tribes 
retain their traditional business practices, the paper predicted that the tribes' 
traditional values will "inevitabl[y]" be "displaced by public relations, 
marketing and conventional business methodology .... "218 The Wall Street 
Journal asserted in 2001 that Indian tribes "are unschooled in the ways of 
high finance and distrust anything involving Wall Street."219 
The concept of Indian tribes in the nation's political discourse as 
businesses arose only within the past few decades. By some defenders of 
tribal rights, economic development on Indian reservations amounted to 
merely corporate exploitation, making only a few individual Indians 
wealthy. As recently as 1983, the venerable New York Times opined that 
tribal governments are merely "administrative authorities imposed by the 
Government and managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs."22o The edi-
torial argued that the 1982 Tribal Tax Status Act would not bring Indians 
back from poverty and asserted, "it is clear that, far from being concerned 
with the social problems of the Indians, the [Reagan] Administration seeks 
only to facilitate corporate opportunities for the exploitation of resources on 
Indian lands."221 The paper noted the example of the Anaconda Corpora-
tion, which "exhausted the resources" on the Laguna Pueblo and then 
ceased operation of the Jackpile Mine.222 
Tribes have come a long way from the days where non-Indian-owned 
corporations, with the consent, assent, and collusion of federal agencies, bu-
reaucrats, and appointed officials, would routinely exploit the natural 
resources of Indian reservations. Though the Navajo Nation recently lost a 
claim for $600 million plus interest against the federal government for 
cheating it out of royalties it should have earned from Peabody Coal, the 
216. See Christopher Parkes, Business Replaces Tradition on California's Reservations: 
Poised/or a Bold Expansion to Their Casino Industry, Indians are Embracing Modern Practices, 
FINANCIAL TiMES (London), Mar. 30, 2001, at 11 ("Marketing is an art little known to the tribes, 
while southern California's population is the most diverse in the country and television advertising 
the costliest."). 
217. Id. For a discussion of the legal foundations of the expansion of Indian gaming in 
California, see K. Alexa Koenig, Gambling on Proposition IA: The California Indian Self-
Reliance Amendment, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 1033 (2002). 
218. Parkes, supra note 216, at 11. 
219. Dugan, supra note 151, at AI. 
220. Means, supra note 125, § 4, at 16. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
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Nation's claim against the coal company for the same amount is pro-
gressing nicely in federal courtS.223 Other tribes, such as the Southern Utes, 
have taken control of their natural resources and are using them for their 
own, significant benefit.224 
However, there are dangers to Indian tribes forced to operate busi-
nesses in order to raise revenue to fund and operate governmental services. 
The 1983 New York Times editorial raised some of these issues in its crude 
manner, noting that "the majority of Indian people have expressed time and 
time again their unwillingness to exploit their economic resources for 
profit .... "225 Moreover, the editors added, "Indians who benefit eco-
nomically from this exploitation are being coerced into the abandonment of 
their traditional view of the relationship between human society and nature 
as one of cooperative support .... "226 The Times later amended its view 
slightly by suggesting that only non-Indian "critics of the tribal govern-
ments argue that elected chairmen and councils are creatures of white 
interests in need of legally binding signatures of trade agreements and 
leases."227 Though these words sound in obvious paternalism and (unin-
tentional) condescension, the editors had a point, to a degree. There are 
tribes, the Hoopa Valley Tribe for example, that will virtually run out of 
natural resources to sell to the dominant society. While it is unrealistic to 
assume that the tribes in this situation will expire, as the New York Times 
seemed to assert in the early 1980s, these issues must be addressed by any 
tribe with finite natural resources. 
Tribal members on the outside looking in on tribal business projects 
may oppose the projects because they feel the tribal government is not pro-
viding adequate information to the membership or for other political 
reasons. Many Oklahoma Seminoles opposed a tribal project to open a bin-
go hall in Florida because they said "the project [wa]s moving too fast and 
without enough details."228 
The tribes that have most fit into the non-Indian style of business, by 
taking control of the businesses away from the tribal government, have 
been given kudos from the business newspapers as successful. The Wall 
Street Journal wrote up the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the 
223. See Peabody Coal v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 
S.Ct. 910 (2005). 
224. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. 
225. Means, supra note 125, § 4, at 16. 
226. Id. 
227. Iver Peterson, Should Majorities Rule Reservation?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1985, § 4, at 
4. 
228. Beall, supra note 101, at Fl. 
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Flathead Reservation (CSKT) as an example of this mode of thinking.229 
The Journal asserted that "tribal politicians still get in the way too often, 
micromanaging their way down to who gets hired, who gets fired and what 
color the walls should be painted."23o According to the Journal, CSKT fit 
the bill for outside businesses: 
"I thought we were going to get into a situation where there was a 
lot of bureaucracy," admits John Willis, an Air Force executive 
who brought S&K Technologies in with only a one-year contract 
at first. But "right off the bat we saw the bureaucracy was not 
there, and they could make quick decisions," Mr. Willis says. One 
likely reason the company is so efficient: the tribal politicians stay 
out of it. "I've never met any of the tribal councilor any of that 
stuff," Mr. Willis says.23J 
The Journal added that CSKT started the business and made itself the 
owner and sole shareholder, but appointed non-tribal council members to sit 
on the company's board of directors, a development the Journal praised.232 
In this circumstance, the managers of the tribal company complimented the 
arrangement as being less "hierarchical" than other businesses, coupled 
with more "urgency" and "teamwork."233 In the event the tribal politicians 
attempt to regain more control over the business, the Journal reported that 
the tribe's attorneys step in and talk them out of it: 
Tribal council members-particularly those new to office 
-occasionally make plays to gain more control. "It does ebb and 
flow," says Mr. [Greg] DuMontier. "But their own tribal attorneys 
are quick to step in." The lawyers' argument: staying out of day-
to-day operations maintains a liability wall between the tribe's 
private ventures and the deep pockets of its land holdings. "At 
that point," Mr. DuMontier says, "the tribal council's thinking 
becomes, 'Oh yeah, OK, we better retreat."'234 
229. See Morse, supra note 122, at 16 ("The tribe's two main ventures- the IT company and 
an older enterprise that make circuit boards-don't wait for customers to come to rural Montana. 
Their first goal is profits, not jobs. And they're not messed with by their tribal politicians."). 
230. [d. 
231. [d. 
232. See id. ("The council made itself the sole, single shareholder, but it didn't declare itself 
the board of directors, as often happens at other tribes. Instead, it appointed a board, composed of 
triba~, members, and required the business managers to come before the council only once a 
year. ). 
233. [d. 
234. See id. 
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Another tribal business that has succeeded, especially in the eyes of the 
Wall Street Journal, is the Winnebago Tribe in Nebraska, which operates 
Ho-Chunk Industries, Inc.235 Business managers chose to seek "profit first" 
and then focus on a jobs creation strategy.236 Prior to the rise of HCI, "the 
tribe often agonized before making business moves and focused on creating 
jobs for tribe members[,] . ' .. including ... day long meetings" to make 
business decisions.237 Once the politicians were pushed out the way, the 
money began to flow. 
Business experts like the Wall Street Journal pounce on any financially 
successful tribe that has concomitant political problems. For these experts, 
"[t]ribal council meetings become a vehicle for political patronage."238 The 
Journal recently published a story on the Southern Ute tribe in Colorado, 
treating the story like an expose rather than mere coverage.239 The article 
summarized the fabulous successes of the tribe by noting that "[t]he tribe's 
business plans and newfound wealth have led to environmental contro-
versies, racial tensions, even a murder. And many Southern Utes are un-
easy and resentful about how the tribe's wealth is distributed, a topic that 
inspires shouting matches at tribal meetings and requests for order of pro-
tection."240 Reporting that the tribe's business decisions are generally made 
by "white executives, who dominate the tribe's top business posts,"241 the 
article emphasized the complaints of tribal members who view themselves 
as out of the loop, quoting one member as asserting that "tribal leaders and 
white executives are gaining too much power, creating a 'nouveau riche 
banana republic. "'242 Again asserting that tribes are socialists, the paper 
quoted one of the tribe's business managers as alleging, "I'm a capitalist 
working for a bunch of socialists."243 
When a tribe begins to see economic success, its members quickly de-
mand accountability, a democratic institution not seen in today's business 
climate (nor, it appears, in today's democracy), and readily criticized by the 
business experts. In the case of the Southern Utes, the Journal character-
ized this form of political pressure as paranoia: "[S]ince big business 
moves were made without the input of tribal members, they began to 
235. See FiaIka, supra not~ 158, at A4. 
236. See id. 
237. Id. 
238. Anderson, supra note 109, at AlD. 
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suspect they weren't getting their fair share of the profits."244 Such re-
portage evidences the focus of business papers on the limitations of tribal 
governments qua business because of their status as tribal governments qua 
governments. This emphasis is beside the point. 
In addition to criticizing any tribe that allows its tribal government to 
control the tribal businesses, the business papers assume that tribal courts 
are inherently political and biased. The Wall Street Journal reported the 
point of view of non-Indian business interests sued in tribal court: "[com-
panies] say the tribal-court experience is like litigating in a foreign country. 
Tribes generally have no established business law, and cases can turn on 
unwritten custom and tradition."245 Non-Indian litigants in tribal courts 
(usually with weak cases) sometimes refuse to even try tribal court, labeling 
them "kangaroo courts."246 In the case of CSKT, the Wall Street Journal 
praised the tribe for instituting reforms that made the tribal court "less-
political."247 However, "Indian courts generally have light dockets and 
provide relatively swift justice."248 
Finally, economic development strategies are bound to affect tribal 
culture, though there is no agreement on how traditional culture will suffer 
or survive in these circumstances.249 The case of the Southern Utes demon-
strates this uncertainty: 
Some Southern Utes worry that the money will erode their culture. 
"Before money, everything was easier, simpler," says Everett 
Burch, brother of the former chairman. People have lost their 
hunting skills, he says, and wouldn't know how to survive without 
their "luxuries" such as electricity. Tribal leaders argue that the 
money will help preserve the culture: with profits from its funds, 
the tribe has built an elementary school to teach the Southern Ute 
language and traditions. Meanwhile, ... a new apprenticeship 
program will elevate more members to leadership spots in the 
tribe's businesses.25o 
244. Id. 
245. Richard B. Schmitt, Tribal Courts Draw Adroit Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1998, 
at BI. 
246. James Bandler, Tribe Gets Bigger Shield Against Suits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2000, at I 
(discussing Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot, 204 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
247. Morse, supra note 122, at 16. 
248. Schmitt, supra note 245, at BI (quoting Seth Lesser, a New York lawyer). 
249. See generally Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Pursuing Tribal Economic Development at 
the Bingo Palace, 29 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 97 (1997) (discussing ways tribes can limit the impacts of 
tribal businesses, particularly gaming, on tribal culture through the lens of Louise Erdrich's THE 
BINGO PALACE (1994)). 
250. Dugan, supra note 130, at AI. 
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Many tribes suffer from internal divisiveness over the question of whether 
to commence gaming operations. As the New York Times recently reported, 
Inside Indian territories, which are considered sovereign entities, a 
battle is raging over whether casinos represent genuine salvation or 
false temptation. It is a clash between those with a reverence for 
the old ways and those with a thirst for a revenue stream. It is an 
argument over who will control the receipts and whether 
exchanging vows with state governments is worth selling a piece 
of autonomy.251 
The Times reported that there are major rifts within families at the Saginaw 
Chippewa Tribe in Michigan, where disenrollments are a major feature; the 
Oneida Indian Nation, where the tribe's powerful and charismatic leader is 
opposed by his aunt, a powerful elder; and many other tribes. 252 Political 
territories within the Navajo Nation have strongly advocated for gaming 
while the remainder of the tribe opposes gaming.253 Gaming compact terms 
become critical campaign issues in tribal politics,254 Unlike non-Indian 
businesses, where corporate structure intends to keep politics out of the 
equation, tribal governments are directly accountable to their constituents. 
Tribal governments' democracy is far more advanced and effective than 
American democracy (and corporate democracy, which is an oxymoron). 
One of the positive side effects of economic development revenues is 
that tribes have begun to think about restructuring themselves in a more 
culturally compatible way. Connecticut tribes, for instance, have begun this 
process.255 
251. David W. Chen & Charlie LeDuff, Bad Blood in Battle Over Casinos; Issue Divides 
Tribes and Families as Expansion Looms, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 28,2001, at A29. 
252. See id. 
253. See id. 
254. E.g., William Taylor, Money Helps Government, Widens Tribe's Influence, 
ALEXANDRIA TOWN TALK (La.), Nov. 2, 2003, available at 2003 WL 57414137 ("Tribal 
Chairman Lovelin Poncho and former Vice Chairman William Worfel negotiated the current 
compact, but their leadership is now under attack from within the tribe."). 
255. See Hamilton, supra note 115, § 13CN, at 3, stating: 
With the introduction of a very strong and successful economic development project, 
the tribe has seen an opportunity and probably a need to take a look at its governing 
document and ask, "Does this give us adequate protection? Does this define the 
government structure? Does this allow us to do as much as possible with our 
community?" I think you will find it's not unique to this tribe, that tribes all over the 
country are reviewing their constitutions. 
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E. VIOLENT DANGER TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRIBAL 
GOVERNMENT IN THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
1. Internal Dangers-New York Indians 
799 
When the Onandaga Indian Nation and business owners on the reser-
vation became involved in a dispute over reservation taxes, the dispute 
became violent and the state patrol closed down roads leading into the 
reservation.256 Similarly, in the Seneca Nation, three Indian men were 
killed in a reservation dispute over whether to cave-in to the state on 
taxes.257 Tribal members "referred to the coming conflict as 'the Seneca's 
last stand. "'258 
The last few years have not necessarily quelled the potential for vio-
lence. When the New York legislature passed a budget requiring the 
governor to collect taxes from reservation retailers, tribal leaders "could not 
promise [that] the tribe could keep a lid on any potential disorder."259 
2. External Dangers-Narragansett/Kansas 
In 1995, the State of New York issued an order to plan the military 
invasion of three Iroquois communities so that "unpaid" taxes on the sale of 
cigarettes, alcohol, and gaming revenues to non-Natives could be collected 
by the state.260 
The days of surrounding Indian tribes with hordes of state police, 
federal agents, and militias in order to force them to capitulate to the domi-
nant culture's view of the law appear to be over, mostly. 
With the advent of increased business sophistication by tribes and the 
rise of tribal leadership that "thought working within the system was better 
than resisting it,"261 tribal leaders expected that nasty and sometimes violent 
confrontations with state officials would cease.262 Recent events have 
proven otherwise. 
256. See Associated Press, Highway Access to Onandaga Reservation Is Restricted in a Tax 
Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1993, at B6. 
257. See Robert D. McFadden, Seneca Feud Boils Over; 3 Are Slain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 
1995, at 41. 
258. Id. (quoting Duane Ray, former Seneca president). 
259. See AI Baker, Seneca Indians Start Ad Campaign Against State's Tax Plan for 
Reservations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003, at B6. 
260. Kallen Martin, Indians Not Taxed: Will Sovereignty Survive?, AKWE-KON'S J. 
INDIGENOUS ISSUES, June 30, 1996, available at 1996 WL 16437998. 
261. Stingley, supra note 87, available at 1984 WL 2522275. 
262. See id. ("'I think we feel that there are enough professional people now in the tribes that 
the days of confrontation are over .... "') (quoting Rick Kitto, Jr. chairman of the Santee tribe). 
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The rise of tribal smokeshops offering tax-free cigarettes has lead to an 
increase of state enforcement actions against both Indians and non-Indians 
alike. In the Yakama reservation in Washington state, state officers rou-
tinely "confiscate[] loads of [cigarette] cartons on their way to smokeshops 
and untaxed cigarettes found in vehicles driven by non-Indians."263 In 
Kansas, state officials swore out a warrant, for failure to pay taxes to the 
state, for the arrest of the chief executive officer of Ho-Chunk, Inc. only 
four months after he received an award from Harvard University as a model 
of success in tribal communities.264 
State governments have a method of backing up their authority that 
tribes may never have, certainly not in the foreseeable future. States have 
the authority to sanction violence against Indians and tribal business. Re-
cent history strongly suggests that states will use this force against Indians 
and tribes-even on their own land. If a state official believes enough in 
his or her legal position, he or she may literally call on attack dogs to force 
the law down tribes' throats. In the words of Professor Robert N. Clinton, 
the Supreme Court's recent history of voting down tribal government rights 
to regulate and tax non-Indians has '''creat[ed] a climate which gives state 
officials the belief that they could do what they did, which is not a healthy 
development. '''265 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR LAW REFORM 
As a matter of both federal and international law, Indian tribes have a 
right to self-determination, self-governance, and self-sufficiency. Without 
economic development as a means to generate revenue, that right is empty. 
Currently, as noted in this article, federal and state law conspires to 
effectively eviscerate Indian tribes' right to generate revenue as other 
governments do and through economic development. Moreover, Indian 
tribes have inherent limitations that restrict their ability to generate revenue 
through economic development. There are a number of relatively simple 
changes in the law that would go a long way toward improving the capacity 
of Indian tribes to generate revenue. 
The first subset of reforms includes the extension of Indian tribes' 
authority to tax non-Indians and to otherwise regulate non-Indians. The 
Supreme Court has artificially taken away this authority through a line of 
263. Zimmennan, supra note 136, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3016298. 
264. See Matt Moline, Nebraska Tribal Corporation Maintains Gas Tax Exemption, TOPEKA 
CAPITAL-J. (Kan.), Jan. 27,2003, at CI, available at 2003 WL 6854626. 
265. Michael Corkery, Indians Say it May Be Fighting Time Again, PROVIDENCE J. (R.I.), 
Aug. 25, 2003, at Al (quoting Robert N. Clinton, law professor, Arizona State University Law 
School). 
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cases starting with Montana v. United States266 and culminating with 
Nevada v. Hicks.267 This solution is a political solution, one that requires 
political will from Congress and the President to complete. In at least two 
earlier situations, Congress has effectively overruled Supreme Court deci-
sions.268 However, both of those decisions created what Congress believed 
to be a gap in criminal jurisdiction and, as a result, a political furor. A 
"Hicks fix"-type reform is very unlikely to be implemented, as it would 
entail the extension of tribal authority over non-Indians, ensuring a political 
firestorm.269 
The second subset of reforms is a simple designation (or re-
designation) of Indian tribal businesses as government entities. Congress 
could implement this change with a simple amendment to the Tribal Tax 
Status Act. Alternatively, courts could and should follow the bright-line 
rule of treating tribal business as arms of tribal government. 
A. "HICKS FIx" -TYPE REFORM 
This reform, known to many as the "Hicks fiX,"270 is in direct response 
to the Supreme Court's 2001 decisions Nevada v. Hicks271 and Atkinson 
Trading, Inc. v. Shirley.272 Hicks held that tribal courts have no jurisdiction 
over non-Indians absent the consent of the non-Indian or some extremely 
rare circumstances.273 In particular, Atkinson Trading held that Indian 
tribes may not validly enact taxes on non-Indians, non-Indian-owned land, 
or non-Indian businesses absent the same circumstances as Hicks.274 The 
"Hicks fix" would effectively reverse these decisions and several other 
Supreme Court decisions, such as Montana v. United States,275 Brendale v. 
266. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
267. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
268. See United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628, 1633 (2004) (discussing 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) 
(2000) as a Congressional response to Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990»; CANBY, supra note 
69, at 20 (noting that Congress effectively overruled Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (l883), by 
enacting the Major Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 385 (1885». 
269. See Rhina Guidos, Tribes Making Play for More Jurisdiction, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 
29,2003, at 85 (detailing reaction of state politicians to the "Hicks fix"). 
270. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the 
Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. F. ON c.L. & C.R. 1, 34 
(2003); Guidos, supra note 267, at 85. 
271. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
272. 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
273. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 381-82. 
274. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc., 532 U.S. 645, at 659. 
275. 450 U.S. 544 (l981). 
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Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Reservation,276 South 
Dakota v. Bourland,277 and A-J Constructors, Inc. v. Strate. 278 
The focus of the various proposals that would overrule Hicks and 
Atkinson Trading is, according to "Hicks fix" opponents, "criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over everyone in Indian Country."279 With jurisdiction over 
non-Indians living in Indian Country, tribes would have the authority to tax 
those non-Indians. '''This is local control, right off the Republican plat-
form. "'280 
However, non-Indians strongly oppose Indian jurisdiction over them, 
arguing "the centralized power found in tribal lands raises issues of fair-
ness."281 And, since non-Indians have far more political power than Indians, 
it is extremely unlikely that a straight-up "Hicks fix" will ever come to pass. 
Nevertheless, there are alternatives. 
B. TRIBAL BUSINESSES As NON-PROAT ARMS OF TRIBAL 
GOVERNMENT REPLETE WITH TRIBAL GOVERNMENT 
RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES 
If Indian tribes are treated properly, as governments and not as cor-
porations, then the concept of trying to take revenue away from tribes 
through taxation or limiting their authority to acquire revenue becomes 
unreasonable. "'If you ha[ vel these conservative Republicans all of a sud-
den trying to tax county governments or state lotteries people would look at 
them like they're crazy .... "'282 Those who oppose Indian taxation will 
appear unreasonable: "[A]ny Montana resident who drives across the 
border to Wyoming and buys something pays a sales tax - without any say 
in how that tax was levied. "283 
However, state governments see Indian tribes as mere businesses. As 
one state official noted, "'We don't see this as a jurisdictional issue,' said 
Gayle Martin of the Kansas Revenue department. 'We see them as a pri-
vate company that owes the tax just like any other distributor. "'284 This 
analysis is deeply flawed. Indian tribes are not businesses. The point is so 
276. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
277. 508 U.S. 679 (1993). 
278. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
279. Guidos, supra note 267, at B5. 
280. Roesler, supra note 154, at Al (quoting John McCoy). 
281. Guidos, supra note 267, at B5. 
282. Egan, supra note 210, at AI (quoting Bill Gollnick, an Oneida leader). 
283. Id. 
284. Henry J. Cordes, Winnebago Tribe's Gasoline Tankers Impounded in Tax Dispute With 
Kansas, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Neb.), Apr. 12,2002, at AI. 
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simple and yet rarely understood that it bears repeating: Indian tribes are 
not businesses. 
1. Indian Tribal Businesses are Arms of Tribal Government 
Federal and state courts, as well as federal agencies, are struggling with 
arcane, complicated, and subjective lines of analyses to determine whether 
businesses operated by Indian tribes should be treated as though they are 
simply businesses subjected to state and federal law. For example, some 
federal circuits and federal agencies engage in what is known as the 
Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene line of analysis to determine whether a federal 
statute of general applicability applies to an Indian tribe or tribal business or 
whether it abrogates the sovereign immunity of that tribe or tribal 
business.285 Other. courts engage in a complex and subjective three-part test 
to determine if a tribal business entity may retain the sovereign immunity of 
the tribe.286 
A bright-line rule that treats all tribal businesses as government entities 
providing government services avoids these analyses and reinforces the 
capacity of tribes to generate revenues that fund critical governmental 
services. A technical amendment to the Tribal Tax Status Act could create 
this bright-line rule. The amendment could read, "Business entities organ-
ized by Indian tribes under tribal, federal, or state law are governmental 
entities endowed with immunity from suit and exempt from state and local 
taxation."287 Indian tribes are competent to waive these immunities for 
285. E.g., Rorida Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Ra., 166 F.3d 1126 
(IlIh Cir. 1999) (applying Tuscarora principle to tribal businesses); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand 
& Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Smart v. State Farm Ins., 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 
1989) (same); Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 672 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1983) (same). See 
generally Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L.REV. 691 
(2005). 
286. E.g., Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 294 (Minn. 1996). Gavle held that a 
tribal business must fulfill a three-part test to retain tribal sovereign immunity: 
(I) whether the business entity is organized for a purpose that is governmental by 
nature, rather than commercial; (2) whether the tribe and the business entity are 
closely linked in governing structure and other characteristics; and (3) whether federal 
policies intended to promote tribal autonomy are furthered by the extension of 
immunity to the tribal entity. 
Id. See also Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1110-11 (Ariz. 1989) (adopting three-
part test); Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 71 Cal. App. 4th 632, 639, 84 Cal. Rpt. 2d 65, 69 
(Cal. App. 1999) (adopting Gavle test); In re Ransom, 658 N.E.2d 989,992 (N.Y. 1995) (adopting 
a six-part test). 
287. See Stephen P. McCleary, Comment, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of States 
Jurisdiction to Tax on Indian Reservations, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 627 (1990-1991). 
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business purposes288 and are wise enough to waive their immunities 
intelligently.289 
2. Allow Tribal Governments to "Market the Exemption" in 
Order to Compete With State and Local Governments 
State and local governments have long exempted land within its 
jurisdiction from taxes for the purpose of luring established businesses into 
the area or encouraging the establishment of new businesses in the area.290 
Often, these tax exemptions are justified by rhetoric about reducing the 
competitive advantages of other states and jurisdictions that do the same.291 
In essence, states and localities are marketing their exemption. 
Indian tribes, most of them without a tax base, cannot encourage new 
business or lure existing business to Indian Country without providing some 
sort of tax advantage or other carrot. Tribes should be able to market what-
ever exemption they can, the same as state and local governments. Again, a 
technical amendment to the Tribal Tax Status Act could complete this goal. 
The prohibition against tribes marketing the exemption is, in fact, a policy 
decision made by the Supreme Court.292 Congress could easily overrule 
this doctrine. 
3. Revive the "Tribal Infringement" Test of Williams v. Lee 
In Williams v. Lee,293 the Supreme Court articulated what became 
known as the "tribal infringement" test.294 The language from which this 
test is derived reads, "[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question 
288. See CANBY, supra note 69, at 101 ("There is no longer any doubt that a tribe can waive 
its own immunity."). 
289. See generally Thomas P. Schlosser, Sovereign Immunity: Should the Sovereign Control 
the Purse?, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 309 (2000). 
290. See Robert Gavin, Regional Report: States Lure Plants With Tax Breaks, WALL ST. 1., 
lune 27, 2001, at BI2 (discussing a $17.5 million tax exemption for a coal-fired power plant in 
Illinois); Ken Gepfert & lames Peter Rubin, Breakaway (A Special Report): The Money Game: 
For Your Benefit: Government Incentives Aren't Just for the Big Guys. Anymore; Here's How to 
Get Your Share, WALL ST. 1., Sept. 28, 1998, at 9; Michael M. Phillips, Localities Force Firms to 
Keep Promises; Companies That Renege Can Lose Their Tax Incentives, WALL ST. J., lune 26, 
1996, at A2 (acknowledging that states and localities provide tax breaks to companies); Peter 
Mitchell, Long on the Sidelines, Florida Joins the Recruiting Giveaway Game, WALL ST. 1., Mar. 
8,1995, at F5 (noting that Florida gave away $109 million in taxes to lure businesses to the·state). 
291. See Mitchell, supra note 280, at F5 ("'It's a competitive disadvantage we have in 
Florida."') (quoting the Executive Director of the Florida Economic Development Council). 
292. See N. Bruce Duthu, The Thurgood Marshall Papers and the Quest for A Principled 
Theory of Tribal Sovereignty: Fueling the Fires of TriballState Conflict, 21 VT. L. REV. 47,74-
97 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court's deliberations leading the establishment of the doctrine 
disapproving of tribes marketing the exemption). 
293. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
294. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220. 
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has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."295 The 
Court later adopted a federal law preemption test to determine whether a 
state law is invalid in Indian Country, but the Court also made clear that 
these two tests are "independent because either, standing alone, can be a 
sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on 
the reservation or by tribal members."296 However, few courts engage in 
this analysis because, as one prominent commentator noted, "the standard 
of Williams v. Lee does not lend itself to a balancing process."297 
Tribes should be able to make out a strong case that tribal self-
government is impossible without the ability to generate revenue. Recently, 
one federal district court held that a tribe may regulate and tax the motor 
vehicle registration of cars on the reservation and, more importantly, that 
the tribe's motor vehicle and registration law preempted state law in 
accordance with the tribal infringement test.298 Similarly, two state courts 
have recently concluded that a state court would have no jurisdiction over a 
lawsuit that directly affected the right of the affected tribe to govern 
itself,299 even where the parties to the suit were both non-Indian.3oo 
The ability of an Indian tribe to raise revenues that will adequately fund 
tribal government services such as housing, health care, social services, 
education, law enforcement and public safety, youth and elder services, and 
even job creation is a right of self-government. The ability of states and lo-
calities to impose a tax on top of tribal taxes in Indian Country directly and 
significantly curtails the right of tribes to raise revenue and, therefore, the 
right of the tribe to govern. The refusal to allow tribes to govern non-
Indians living (voluntarily) within Indian Country affects the right of the 
tribes to govern. The doctrine is already on the books and should be util-
ized and approved by courts. 
VI. POSTLUDE-CAPTURING KEYSER SOZE 
Listen. Imagine that after Keyser Soze fools the police and gets away, 
the police keep looking. What would happen? Imagine that a group of 
295. Id. at 220. 
296. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). 
2CJ7. CANBY, supra note 69, at 287. 
298. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Wagnon, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1188 (D. Kan. 
2003). 
299. See Winer v. Penny Enters., Inc., 2004 ND 21, ~ 22,674 N.W.2d 9, 17; Rodriguez v. 
Wong, 82 P.3d 263, 267 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004); see also Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eagleman, 705 
P.2d 1117 (Mont. 1985) (rejecting state court jurisdiction over a claim brought by an insurance 
company to collect damages from a reservation Indian). 
300. Rodriguez, 82 P.3d at 265. 
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screenwriters sit down and draft a sequel, probably called something inane 
like The Usual Suspects 2: The Capture of Keyser Soze. Each year, they 
take this screenplay to the major movie studios. The producers hand over 
the draft to their interns and underlings for study and thank the drafters for 
this idea. They get hundreds, thousands of pitches every year. And these 
movie studios, these producers, are not likely to ever produce this movie. 
There are no stars. The producers did not write a single scene for Renee 
Zellwegger or Tom Cruise or Lucy Liu or Will Smith. There is nothing to 
guarantee a huge opening weekend. There is no likelihood that this 
screenplay will win any of the producers a major award. In fact, the film is 
likely to create a backlash against the studio from its major advertisers. It 
will be an unpopular film because it might take money from the pockets of 
the advertisers. Not a lot, but the advertisers are jealous of their revenues. 
Similarly, the tribes take the "Hicks fix" to Congress each year in one 
form or another, just as they did with the "Duro fix." They worked hard on 
putting the bill together, drawing on the experience and expertise of tribal 
leaders, lobbyists, and lawyers. But these tribes are not multi-billion dollar 
corporations with millions of dollars to throw around at the Democrats or 
Republicans like political powerhouses. They have some money, money 
that gets them in the door, but not the kind of money that makes Senate 
committee chairs or the Speaker of the House sit down with them per-
sonally. The tribes are not political stars. And when the tribes leave after 
their meeting with Congressional staffers, the Senate committee chair and 
the Speaker receive a call from the governor of a major swing state who 
warns them that this bill would reduce state government revenues by 
millions. Of course, the economists said that the revenues would be re-
duced by less than one percent, but there is an extremely slight possibility 
that the revenues would in fact be reduced by millions. The mere threat is 
enough to kill the bill. 
But what if the screenwriters take the screenplay to an independent 
film studio? Independent film studios do not need stars, although they 
would not mind a few who would agree to work for scale. Their movies are 
cheap, relatively, and they do not need huge advertisers. They often have 
open minds about new ideas and strange new screenplays that seem pretty 
viable, if original. But these indies are rare and hard to find. Plus, they 
hear tons of pitches, too. And when these screenwriters pitch the idea of 
doing a sequel of The Usual Suspects it is not the first time they have heard 
a pitch like that. The pitch has to be excellent, it has to be unique, and it 
has to have an airtight plot. And even that might not matter if the indie 
movie producers do not want a movie where the police catch Keyser 
Soze-they might only think about producing a film where Keyser Soze 
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gets away. But once in a while, a long while, they agree to make a movie 
with this kind of plot. 
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